Securing Distributed .NET Applications Using Advanced Runtime Access Control

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**Abstract.** The architecture and integration of distributed applications increased in complexity over the last decades. It was Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) that answered most of the emerging questions by its explicit and contract-based interface definitions for services and autonomous components. The exposed functionality can be used by anyone who has access to the public interface of SOA applications. Due to loose security handling, risks often emerge in SOA applications. Interfaces are usually published to an unnecessarily wide set of clients. Although there are attempts to implement fine-grained access control mechanisms in object-oriented programming languages like Eiffel, C# and Java, these solutions are in-process that means that they cannot cross service contract boundaries in distributed applications. For these, it is of utmost importance to validate the type and the identity of the caller, track the state of the business process and even validate the client itself using simple, declarative syntax. In this paper we present a framework that aims to introduce fine-grained access control mechanisms in the context of distributed .NET applications. We present a semi-formalized description of the framework and also a pilot implementation on the .NET platform.

1 Introduction

The complexity of IT systems has been getting increasingly complex ever since the beginning of software development. IT systems and the business processes they serve span over multiple networks, computers, and programming languages as well. What makes things even more complicated is that pieces of software serving specific business goals (the steps of business processes) are dynamically changing. As a consequence, architects and developers face system integration issues in a dynamically changing technical and business environment. Until recently, integration of systems has been performed either manually or using hard-coded modules that were difficult to maintain and failed in a changing environment. Manual integration has been time consuming and prone to errors, while hard coded solutions require knowledge of all connected systems and have to be re-designed and implemented when any of the underlying systems or steps of the business process changes.

It is Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [1, 10]that answers the most common difficulties of system integration. From the historical point of view, SOA is an evolution of modular programming, so it extends its basic principles. Reuse, granularity, modularity, composability, componentization, and interoperability are common requests for a SOA application as well as for modular object oriented applications.

However, while the elementary building block of an object oriented software is the class, the basic element of a SOA application is typically a much larger component. These larger chunks of functionality are called services, and this is where the name Service Oriented Architecture originates from. Services implement a relatively large set of functionality, and should be as independent of each other as possible. This means that services should have control over the logic they encapsulate and should not call each other directly. Rather, if a more complex behavior is required, they should be composed to more complex composite services. In other words, services should be autonomous and composable.

Services expose their functionality through service contracts. A contract describes the functions that can be invoked, the communication protocols as well as the authentication and authorization schemes. The exposed functionality is usually a public interface that can be called by anyone who is authenticated, is aware of the existence of the service and uses the required communication protocol. The keyword is that the exposed functionality is basically *public*, and users have quite limited amount of control over the identity and the nature of a caller.

However, in a realistic scenario it can also happen that the identity of the caller or the set of allowed methods depends on the state of the underlying business process or other available information. This is usually hard to express, and due to the lack of technology support for fine-grained, or higher level access control, it is challenging to implement the above mentioned scenario using standard protocols, programming environments and tools.

In [4, 15] we have implemented a pilot approach to implement Eiffel-like selective feature export in C# 3.0. This solution makes it possible to control access to protected resources (methods of ‘public’ interfaces) in a declarative way using simple declarative syntax using the concepts of Aspect Oriented Programming [12]. Although the approach works well in everyday application, it cannot be applied in the case of distributed systems.

What makes things even more complicated is that SOA usually integrates systems running on multiple computers and environments, in other words these systems are distributed ones. To successfully implement our solution we have to sacrifice the interoperability property of SOA, which means that our connected applications have to be created using homogeneous communication platforms. The exposed services are required to be aware of some information about clients. Although this requirement is not common for SOA applications, however, other important properties of SOA can remain unchanged (contract based interface specification, autonomous services). Moreover, the security validation attributes can be regarded as part of the contract.

In this paper our aim is to establish a framework that enables users to control access to the members of public interfaces in a SOA-enabled distributed object system [17].

In Section 2 we present a simple motivating example that draws attention to issues when not using fine-grained access control mechanisms.

In Section 3 we present a semi-formalized approach to solving problems presented through the motivating example.

In Section 4 a possible implementation of the theory will be shown. The chosen environment is the .NET platform, the Workflow Foundation engine (now part of the .NET framework), and the C# programming language.

In Section 5 we show some related work and compare our solution to existing ones. In the closing section we summarize our results, and present further research areas.

2 Motivating Example

2.1 Ping-Pong Game

In order to highlight the problematic parts when accessing fully public SOA interfaces, in this subsection we are going to show a simple motivating example. The example is a simple game, through which we describe distributed applications, public interfaces, and access control problems.

First, we place the game in the previously described context. The players of the game run on different computers, so the game is a distributed application. Let’s consider a very simple example: a ping-pong game. In each game there are two players who pass a ball to each other. The players register themselves at the game manager, who gives a unique identifier to each player. The game cannot start until there are exactly two players. The first registered player begins the game, in other words he passes the ball to the other player. The second player should not be allowed to handle the ball until the first player passes it to him. Once the ball is passed to the second player, it is his turn: now the first player should be denied to handle the ball until the second player passes it back, and so on.

The methods of the game are published as an interface. The Game manager class implements this interface and exposes methods of the game to possible clients, primarily players.

The ‘rules’ of the game can be described as a workflow. The workflow itself and its state transitions is a finite state automaton. The finite state automaton can be described as a UML activity diagram [19]. The activity diagram can be seen in . In , the simplified class diagram of the ping-pong game can be seen.



**Fig. 1.** Class diagram of ping-pong game

The game manager is a singleton, there is exactly one instance of the game manager class. Players register themselves at the game manager and get a unique identifier. A game manager can manage many games, and in each game there are exactly two players. Of course a game can be started only if there are exactly two players.

A possible object diagram can be seen in .



**Fig. 2.**  Possible object diagram of a distributed game

The objects may possibly run on different computers. The difficulty is that we want to allow only objects of type Player to call methods of the Ping-pong game object in this distributed environment. What makes things even more complicated is that the ping-pong game has a well-defined sequence of allowed events with a well-defined set of allowed callers, and we have to keep the system consistent based on these rules.

2.2 Security Shortcomings of Recent Business Applications

In real world business applications the sequence and branches of business operations that instrument business processes are well defined and bounded. It is also well defined who can execute a business operation in the lifetime of a business process instance.

The business rules clearly define who is allowed to perform different tasks and also define the exact workflow of our ping-pong game introduced before (even it is not a business application).

Unfortunately, in most real world applications these business rules are not enforced carefully on the server side, they are rather hard coded in the client application. Moreover, the restricted functions - based on the user role and the current state of the process - are simply hidden on the user interface. At the same time the server is open for any kind of requests, therefore an attacker can compromise the business process.

The reason of the previous can be one of the following:

1. Architects and developers do not care of business security
2. Architects and developers think that a simple firewall (that restricts the access of the server from specific subnets) or some built-in authentication is enough
3. Architects and developers think or decide that it is satisfying to implement business security on the client side
4. There is no time and money to implement adequate security mechanisms
5. It is hard to implement business security in a distributed environment

Of course it is hard or cannot be carried out to change the mind of architects and developers therefore we suggest a solution that makes server-side business security checks easier and faster to implement.

3 Solve Shortcomings

First we have to denote which client and business properties are suggested to be checked and tracked to raise the business process security level:

1. The runtime type of the caller class on the client side (ping-pong player in the ping-pong game)
2. State of the business process (e.g. The rules of the ping-pong game in our example)
3. The identity of the client (e.g. Is it the first or the second player in the ping-pong game?)
4. Validate, verify the client itself (e.g. IP address, subnet or some kind of certification of the client)

All of the previous are static or internal properties from the view of the business process, therefore all of them can be checked using *declarative syntax* (statically burned in) or can be read from a configuration database.

When creating a SOA application we publish a contract (an interface) to the outside world. The previous properties can be validated contract-wide and can be validated only for particular business operations published by the contract.

It means that the above properties can be validated at method level at every single call. The granularity level of most of the above properties changes from application level to method level. Informally speaking we introduce a business call level fine-grained “firewall”.

In the next subsections we will examine these four properties from the validability point of view.

We identified the need to give a semi-formalized description of our solution. There are two approaches:

1. Extend some existing description language like BPEL [20, 11]
2. Create a new language that only focuses on the problem presented in this article

Because BPEL focuses on the business process rather than security, and uses XML notation, we have chosen the second approach. BPEL and our semi-formal description can be used side-by-side.

A contract (C) can be defined as a triplet of set of methods, restrictions applied to the contract itself and the set of restrictions applied to individual methods published by the contract.

The restrictions applied to the contract itself () can be formalized using the following triplet:

Here s represents a contract-level type restrictions for allowed callers (subsection 3.1), s denotes a contract-level identity restrictions for allowed callers (subsection 3.3), while s defines a contract-level network restriction (subsection 3.4).

Security restrictions applied to a single method ():

Here s, s and s are the same as their contract-level pairs, while pairs describe the allowed state and state transition constraints (subsection 3.2).

3.1 Distributed Runtime Access Control

We have stated in one of our previous work about in-process systems [4] that reducing the interface where software components can communicate with each other increases software quality, security and decreases development cost. Compile time or runtime visibility and access control checking that support encapsulation is the key part of modern languages and runtime environments [16]. They enforce responsibility separation, implementation and security policies. Most modern programming languages like C++, C# and Java do not have sophisticated access control mechanisms only introduce a subset or combination of the following access modifiers: public, private, protected, internal, and friend while Eiffel defines sophisticated selective access control called selective export.

The Eiffel programming language [13] allows features (methods) to be exposed to any named class. The default access level of a feature is the public level. However, an export clause can be defined for any feature which explicitly list classes that are allowed to access the underlying feature.

In this paper we suggest a runtime access control extension to distributed environments where only well identified classes are allowed to access particular methods. To achieve this goal, the server side should be extended with the ability to detect the runtime type of the caller (client) using a *declarative solution* that statically predefines the allowed callers at the contract or method level.

Another possibility is to restrict access for clients based on group membership or roles (like DCOM [9]). In this case different callers in different roles are to be assigned to (domain level) groups and restrict access of published contracts for certain groups. Moreover, restrictions can be enforced at the operation (method) level to achieve more fine-grained security.

In our ping-ping example only players can participate in matches).

3.2 Business Process Validation

In [6] it is noted that it may be necessary to impose constraints on who can perform a task given that a prior task has been performed by a particular individual. In this section we feature another approach to solve the problems stated in [6].

As we mentioned before business applications are driven by rules that define the following properties:

1. Who is allowed to perform specific actions in given states
2. What is the resulting state of a state transition if a business operation succeeds
3. What is the resulting state of a state transition if a business operation fails

In most cases, business processes defined by rules are hard-coded into applications, therefore they can be treated as static properties.

As suggested before operations exported on the interface are statically bounded to certain process states in which they can be executed, furthermore often initiate a state transition where the process gets into another well-defined state.

Business processes can be represented by state machines which are a kind of directed graphs. Vertices of such a graph are the states of the state machine, while edges are the state transitions between states.

The state machine representing the ‘business process’ behind our ping-pong game can be described by the following UML Activity diagram in *.* For the sake of simplicity we have not incorporated the error states and events where for example one of the players loses the ball.



**Fig. 3.** State Machine of the ping-pong game

The first operation is where the first player gets the ball and hits it (*evtPing*) to the other player therefore the game will be in *Ping* state. After that the second player hits the ball (*evtPong*) to the first player and the game gets into *Pong* state. Now the first player comes again (*evtPing*). If any of the players get bored of the game the match can be finished (*evtFinish*).

Manifestly, such state machines can be statically connected or bounded to one or more published contracts. Operations can be checked if the state machine is in a state that allows the particular operation and can trigger state transitions. When the user instantiates one of the published contracts a state machine instance is automatically attached to the contracts.

Static binding can be implemented declaratively and it is compulsory to have one state machine instance per session.

To describe it formally remind the definition of the finite state machine or simply state machine:

Where

1. represents the input alphabet, in our case the set of state transitions
2. is a finite not empty set of states
3. is an initial state, that is member of S
4. is the state transition function
5. F is the set of finite states, non-empty set in our case

Using the above definition the following restrictions can be applied:

It restricts the states, the state transitions and the state transitions available in certain states.

3.3 Client Identity Validation

In the previous two subsections we have shown that it is indispensable to restrict callers by runtime type or group membership and it is also indispensable to instrument the correct order of business operation execution, enforce business rules.

Notwithstanding the previously mentioned two assurances there is another problem that we show in the context of our ping-pong game. When Player 1 and Player 2 start playing a ping-pong match we have to ensure that the players remain the same until the end of the match. In other words, they do not change sides and they are not substituted with other players. In short we have to maintain and validate the identity of players until the end of the match.

It is possible to dedicate a referee or coordinator that assigns well-defined identities for participants that can be ensured at method calls. For example the player that gets elected as First Player always gets Identity no. *1* while the other player gets *2*.

The above may not give protection from tampering the player identity. But when we assign the *(Name of the Computer, Process Id, Object Reference Id)* triplet to the identity and track it on the server side, it cannot be tampered because the name of the computer must be unique on the network level. Similarly the process id must be unique on the computer level; while the object reference id (practically pair of the runtime type and some type-level unique object id) must be unique on the process level (e.g. hash code is unique for same-typed objects in .NET).

3.4 Network and Certificate Validation of Clients

Firewalls can restrict access from clients deployed on certain subnets or IP addresses to the server. More advanced firewalls can restrict access to the server by domain level user identity; however that capability is only a subset of distributed runtime access control described in this paper.

Our first aim is to declaratively restrict access to specific contracts and also methods for certain subnets even IP addresses.

The other thing that loosely relates to some sort of network-level validation of clients is client certificate validation. Using client certificates it can be verified if the server communicates with a certified, trusted, verified and possibly well-working client. The server can verify if it communicates with clients having the certificate issued by a trusted authority.

3.5 Definition of Legal Calls

Let H the information-set provided and available at a method call:

Where

1. is the type of the caller
2. the actual state (business process state)
3. is the identity of the caller
4. is the network properties of the caller

We say that a call is legal with respect to a method (), when H conforms to the following restrictions:

The four restrictions apply to the four eligible properties of H. However, the second restriction applies only to the available states because the state transitions are restricted by the FSM itself.

4 Possible Implementation in .NET 3.0 Environment

We have created a pilot implementation of the previously described security mechanism extension in .NET 3.0. .NET [14] is a programming platform from Microsoft that helps to easily and effectively create even large scale connected applications built on standard technologies like the Web Service platform [20].

Version 3.0 of .NET added two pilot technologies that are used by our solution:

1. WCF – Windows Communication Foundation and
2. WF – Windows Workflow Foundation

In the following two subsections we shortly describe the benefits of these technologies then show some implementation details.

4.1 WCF - Windows Communication Foundation

’WCF is Microsoft’s unified framework for building secure, reliable, transacted, and interoperable distributed applications.’ [22]

In our situation it means that we get a unified interface for distributed communication while we have the possibility to configure the communication address and binding for our contracts. We can configure different transport and messaging formats (binary, HTTP request, SOAP (Web Service), WSE\*, message queue, etc.), and the communication platform (data transfer protocol, encoding, formatting, etc.).

4.2 WF - Windows Workflow Foundation

’WF is the programming model, engine and tools for quickly building workflow enabled applications. WF radically enhances a developer’s ability to model and support business processes.’ [23]

WF has the ability to model states and state transitions of state machines that resembles mathematical state machines.

4.3 Ping-Pong Example

Because of space limitations we can show only the server side of our implementation in detail. First we will show and explain the contract definition of our ping-pong game exposed by WCF.

The following listing shows the contract definition as an interface in C#:

[ServiceContract(SessionMode=SessionMode.Required)]

[StateMachineDriven]

[CallerIdentityDriven]

public interface IPingPongService : IMultiSession

{

[OperationContract]

[AllowedCaller("Client.Player")]

[AllowedIdentity("1")]

[AllowedState("stFirst,stPong")]

[RaiseTransitionEvent("PingEvent")]

int Ping();

[OperationContract]

[AllowedCaller("Client.Player")]

[AllowedIdentity("2")]

[AllowedState("stPing")]

[RaiseTransitionEvent("PongEvent")]

int Pong();

[OperationContract]

[AllowedCaller("Client.Player")]

[AllowedIdentity("1,2")]

[AllowedState("stPong")]

[RaiseTransitionEvent("FinishEvent")]

int Finish();

}


The first line contains a built-in ServiceContract attribute attached to the IPingPongService interface that enables classes implementing the interface to be exported as a service.

The StateMachineDriven and the CallerIdentityDriver attributes are part of our framework that enables the contract to be validated against state machine states and events, and check for the caller.

The IPingPongService interface inherits from the IMultiSession interface which enables our solution to share the same session across multiple instances of the same contract and also multiple instances of multiple contracts. It is not used in this example; we only indicate the possibility with the remark that SOA applications and distributed object systems do not encourage the usage of sessions.

The OperationContract attribute is the method-level pair of ServiceContract attribute. AllowedCaller and AllowedIdentity attributes define the allowed caller types and identities at particular methods. The AllowedState attribute relates to the state machine controlling the ping-pong game and dictate the states that certain operations can be executed at while the RaiseTransitionEvent attribute instructs our framework to do a state transition after successful method executions.

The following figure shows the design view of the state machine presented as a UML activity diagram in Section 3:



**Fig. 4.** : State Machine Implementation

The previously explained interface is exposed to the client side also while the implementation of the interface stays on the server side and defines properties that are exclusively server specific:

[StateMachineParameters(typeof(PingPongWF),   
 typeof(PingPongController))]

class PingPongService : MultiSession,   
 IPingPongService

{

…

The StateMachineParameters attribute declares a state machine workflow type and a controller type that will be instantiated when the first call occurs. This state machine and controller instance will drive the process (the game in our example).

4.4 Custom Behaviors

Every call to the exposed operations has to be intercepted on the server side and the security checks described in this paper have to be performed. WCF has the ability to extend our service endpoints with custom behaviors that can be used to do security checks.

We mention that WCF calls do not submit the client side caller type and identity information automatically therefore at the client side we have to add headers to every call that contain this information using custom client-side behaviors.

The following XML fragment shows the server side configuration that defines the extension that is responsible for doing security checks before the execution of the exposed operation:

<extensions>  
 <behaviorExtensions>  
 <add name="distrRac"  
 type="ServerLib.RACServerBehaviorExtension, ServerLib, Version=1.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=d18ff0ec0229ce90" />  
 </behaviorExtensions>  
</extensions>

At the client side, there is a similar configuration setting that refers to the ClientLib.RACClientBehaviorExtension type in the ClientLib assembly.

Connecting these extensions to the appropriate services some more lines of XML configuration has to be added.

We show the client code fragment that adds the type of the caller to the request headers that will be verified on the server side:

StackTrace stackTrace = new StackTrace(false);  
StackFrame callerFrame = ClientHelper.GetCallerMethod(stackTrace);  
request.Headers.Add(MessageHeader.CreateHeader(  
 DISTRRAC\_HEADERID, DISTRRAC\_NS,   
 callerFrame.GetMethod().DeclaringType.FullName));

On the server side the following code fragment is executed that checks the type and identity of the caller:

string absUri = request.Headers.To.AbsoluteUri;  
Type contract = ServerHelper.GetContract(absUri);  
object []drivenAttrs = ServerHelper.GetDrivenByAttributes(contract);  
MethodInfo targetMethod = ServerHelper.GetTargetMethod(absUri);  
  
bool callerIdentityDriven =   
 ServerHelper.IsDrivenByCallerIdentity(drivenAttrs);  
bool stateMachineDriven =   
 ServerHelper.IsDrivenByStateMachine(drivenAttrs);

if (callerIdentityDriven)  
{  
 object[] callerAttrs =   
 ServerHelper.GetCallerAttributes(targetMethod);  
 string callerType =   
 request.Headers.GetHeader<string>(DISTRRAC\_HEADERID,   
 DISTRRAC\_NS);  
 if (!ServerHelper.IsCallerAllowed(callerAttrs, callerType))  
 {  
 throw new InvalidCallerException();  
 }  
}

The state machine based verification is performed similarly, however, in that case after the execution of the exposed operation the state machine is driven to the next state.

The other components of the H information set can be checked similarly therefore we omit the discussion of their implementation.

5 Related Work

There are several authors who deal with the security of distributed applications and show the importance of the topic [2, 21]. There are techniques which can be used to generate formal proof that an access request satisfies an access-control policy [3].

[6] provides a method for specifying authorization constraints for workflow based systems that include separation of duty constraints (two different tasks must be executed by different users), binding of duty constraints (same user is required to perform multiple tasks) and cardinality constraints (specify the number that certain tasks have to be executed). A custom reference monitor has been specified that checks the previously mentioned properties of workflows and workflow tasks.

Those parts of our solution that deal with state machines (workflows) and client type and identity validation provide some features in a more sophisticated way than described in [6], however there are some features our framework lacks. The difference between the two approaches can be characterized by the fact that we are dedicated to find answers to shortcomings of working enterprise applications.

The concepts in [8] are based on the workflow RBAC authorization rules that are represented as a tuple (r, t, execute, p) that states that users in r role can execute task t when an optional predicate p holds true). They create an extension to the WARM methodology that enables to determine workflow access control information from the business process model. [21] presents an approach where the workflow access control model is decoupled from the workflow model that enables them to create a service oriented workflow access control model. Our solution follows a different approach that makes it more compact but harder to configure.

Another way would be to create a DSL that is dedicated to implementing services [5] and extend this language with security concepts.

There are approaches that store and control policy settings using some centralized database [7] or have multiple layers of configuration [18]. We decided to create an application specific solution and have unified configuration methodology (declaratively specify settings in the source text on application level or use application-level configuration files).

6 Summary and Future Work

In this paper we have studied access control mechanisms that can be applied in case of distributed software systems.

Applications serving business processes are usually implemented as a distributed system: they span over different servers on different networks. Typical properties of such applications include dynamism: the business goals they serve change just as often as the programming or hardware environments. In order to successfully fight challenges imposed by the nature of these applications, the basic principles of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) have been formed. SOA is a natural extension and descendant of modular programming: the functions of modules are published through interfaces.

In our work we have focused on the public interfaces of SOA applications with the following restrictions:

1. The application should use homogeneous communication platform and
2. The service should have some information about the clients.

We have described motivating examples showing why it is often not enough to rely ourselves on standard security mechanisms of existing standards. Starting from the motivating examples we have shown why lower level access control mechanisms are necessary to protect the interfaces exposing functionality to the outside world.

We have elaborated our research and extended the security context of distributed applications based on the following properties: distributed runtime access control, business process and client identity validation, and the network identity validation of clients. The above properties can be validated at method level at every single call. The granularity level of most of the above properties changes from application level to method level. Informally speaking we introduce a business call level fine-grained “firewall”.

We have been following a semi-formal approach of the topic, and have given a definition of a legal method call. Other solutions described in the related work section solve only a part of the security problems specific to distributed enterprise applications while we aimed to create a framework that answers most of emerging questions.

The formal approach described important runtime restrictions for distributed object systems. However, the formal approach itself cannot guarantee that it can be implemented in practice. In order to prove the practical applicability of the proposal, we have implemented a pilot framework in the .NET 3.0 programming environment. The implementation uses the innovative technologies of the .NET framework: Windows Communication Foundation and Workflow Foundation. We exploited declarative programming to the maximal possible extent.

One of our further research directions can be the extension of the pilot implementation with different environments, such as the Java platform. The capabilities of widely used industrial standards should be analyzed, and, if necessary, the presented formal framework should be refined in order to adapt to different security mechanisms.

We designed our framework to be extensible with other custom security mechanisms that may be orthogonal to the formalized and implemented ones.

This paper also shows the need for runtime access control in order to secure distributed applications. Therefore we hope that similar frameworks will gain popularity and help the quality improvement of complex, distributed object systems.

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