List of usage examples for org.apache.commons.httpclient URI getURI
public String getURI() throws URIException
From source file:com.navercorp.pinpoint.plugin.httpclient3.HttpClient3RequestTrace.java
private static String getHttpUrl(final String host, final int port, final URI uri, final HttpConnection httpConnection) throws URIException { final Protocol protocol = httpConnection.getProtocol(); if (protocol == null) { return uri.getURI(); }// w w w .ja va 2 s . com final StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); final String scheme = protocol.getScheme(); sb.append(scheme).append("://"); sb.append(host); // if port is default port number. if (port != SKIP_DEFAULT_PORT) { sb.append(':').append(port); } sb.append(uri.getURI()); return sb.toString(); }
From source file:com.baidu.oped.apm.profiler.modifier.connector.httpclient3.interceptor.ExecuteInterceptor.java
@Override public void after(Object target, Object[] args, Object result, Throwable throwable) { if (isDebug) { logger.afterInterceptor(target, args); }/* w ww . j a v a2 s .c o m*/ final Trace trace = traceContext.currentTraceObject(); if (trace == null) { return; } try { HttpMethod httpMethod = getHttpMethod(args); if (httpMethod != null) { try { final URI uri = httpMethod.getURI(); String uriString = uri.getURI(); trace.recordAttribute(AnnotationKey.HTTP_URL, uriString); trace.recordDestinationId(getEndpoint(uri.getHost(), uri.getPort())); } catch (URIException e) { logger.error("Fail get URI", e); } recordRequest(trace, httpMethod, throwable); } if (result != null) { trace.recordAttribute(AnnotationKey.HTTP_STATUS_CODE, result); } trace.recordApi(descriptor); trace.recordException(throwable); trace.markAfterTime(); } finally { trace.traceBlockEnd(); } }
From source file:com.navercorp.pinpoint.plugin.httpclient3.interceptor.ExecuteInterceptor.java
@Override public void after(Object target, Object[] args, Object result, Throwable throwable) { if (isDebug) { logger.afterInterceptor(target, args); }/*from www. j a v a 2 s . c om*/ final Trace trace = traceContext.currentTraceObject(); if (trace == null) { return; } try { HttpMethod httpMethod = getHttpMethod(args); if (httpMethod != null) { try { final URI uri = httpMethod.getURI(); String uriString = uri.getURI(); trace.recordAttribute(AnnotationKey.HTTP_URL, uriString); trace.recordDestinationId(getEndpoint(uri.getHost(), uri.getPort())); } catch (URIException e) { logger.error("Fail get URI", e); } recordRequest(trace, httpMethod, throwable); } if (result != null) { trace.recordAttribute(AnnotationKey.HTTP_STATUS_CODE, result); } trace.recordApi(descriptor); trace.recordException(throwable); trace.markAfterTime(); } finally { trace.traceBlockEnd(); } }
From source file:com.navercorp.pinpoint.plugin.httpclient3.HttpClient3RequestTrace.java
@Override public String getUrl() { try {// www . j a v a 2 s . co m final URI uri = this.httpMethod.getURI(); // if uri have schema or not found HttpConnection argument. if (uri.isAbsoluteURI() || this.httpConnection == null) { return uri.getURI(); } final String host = this.httpConnection.getHost(); final int port = getPort(this.httpConnection); return getHttpUrl(host, port, uri, this.httpConnection); } catch (Exception e) { if (isDebug) { logger.debug("Failed to get url. httpMethod={}", this.httpMethod, e); } } return null; }
From source file:de.kimminich.agile.demos.lecture4.TestSQLInjection.java
/** * scans for SQL Injection vulnerabilities */// w w w .jav a 2 s .c om @Override public void scan(HttpMessage msg, String param, String origParamValue) { //Note: the "value" we are passed here is escaped. we need to unescape it before handling it. //as soon as we find a single SQL injection on the url, skip out. Do not look for SQL injection on a subsequent parameter on the same URL //for performance reasons. boolean sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = false; String sqlInjectionAttack = null; HttpMessage refreshedmessage = null; String mResBodyNormalUnstripped = null; String mResBodyNormalStripped = null; try { //reinitialise the count for each type of request, for each parameter. We will be sticking to limits defined in the attach strength logic int countErrorBasedRequests = 0; int countExpressionBasedRequests = 0; int countBooleanBasedRequests = 0; int countUnionBasedRequests = 0; int countOrderByBasedRequests = 0; int countStackedBasedRequests = 0; //TODO: use in the stacked based queries implementation //Check 1: Check for Error Based SQL Injection (actual error messages). //for each SQL metacharacter combination to try for (int sqlErrorStringIndex = 0; sqlErrorStringIndex < SQL_CHECK_ERR.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doErrorBased && countErrorBasedRequests < doErrorMaxRequests; sqlErrorStringIndex++) { //work through the attack using each of the following strings as a prefix: the empty string, and the original value //Note: this doubles the amount of work done by the scanner, but is necessary in some cases String[] prefixStrings; if (origParamValue != null) { prefixStrings = new String[] { "", TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) }; } else { prefixStrings = new String[] { "" }; } for (int prefixIndex = 0; prefixIndex < prefixStrings.length; prefixIndex++) { //new message for each value we attack with HttpMessage msg1 = getNewMsg(); String sqlErrValue = prefixStrings[prefixIndex] + SQL_CHECK_ERR[sqlErrorStringIndex]; setParameter(msg1, param, sqlErrValue); //System.out.println("Attacking [" + msg + "], parameter [" + param + "] with value ["+ sqlErrValue + "]"); //send the message with the modified parameters sendAndReceive(msg1); countErrorBasedRequests++; //now check the results against each pattern in turn, to try to identify a database, or even better: a specific database. //Note: do NOT check the HTTP error code just yet, as the result could come back with one of various codes. Iterator<String> errorPatternIterator = SQL_ERROR_TO_DBMS.keySet().iterator(); while (errorPatternIterator.hasNext() && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { String errorPatternKey = errorPatternIterator.next(); String errorPatternRDBMS = SQL_ERROR_TO_DBMS.get(errorPatternKey); //Note: must escape the strings, in case they contain strings like "[Microsoft], which would be interpreted as regular character class regexps" Pattern errorPattern = Pattern.compile("\\Q" + errorPatternKey + "\\E", PATTERN_PARAM); //if the "error message" occurs in the result of sending the modified query, but did NOT occur in the original result of the original query //then we may may have a SQL Injection vulnerability StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); if (!matchBodyPattern(getBaseMsg(), errorPattern, null) && matchBodyPattern(msg1, errorPattern, sb)) { //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.errorbased.extrainfo", errorPatternRDBMS, errorPatternKey); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlErrValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName() + " - " + errorPatternRDBMS, getDescription(), null, param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg1); //log it, as the RDBMS may be useful to know later (in subsequent checks, when we need to determine RDBMS specific behaviour, for instance) getKb().add(getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI(), "sql/" + errorPatternRDBMS, Boolean.TRUE); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; continue; } } //end of the loop to check for RDBMS specific error messages } //for each of the SQL_CHECK_ERR values (SQL metacharacters) } //############################### //Check 4 //New! I haven't seen this technique documented anywhere else, but it's dead simple. Let me explain. //See if the parameter value can simply be changed to one that *evaluates* to be the same value, //if evaluated on a database //the simple check is to see if parameter "1" gives the same results as for param "2-1", and different results for param "2-2" //for now, we try this for integer values only. //############################### //Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) //then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original query was last run (could be hours ago) //so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. //Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage); //String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); if (!sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doExpressionBased && countExpressionBasedRequests < doExpressionMaxRequests) { //first figure out the type of the parameter.. try { //is it an integer type? int paramAsInt = new Integer(TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue)); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The parameter value [" + TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + "] is of type Integer"); //get a value 2 sizes bigger int paramPlusTwo = paramAsInt + 2; String modifiedParamValue = String.valueOf(paramPlusTwo) + "-2"; //and prepare a request to set the parameter value to a string value like "3-2", if the original parameter value was "1" //those of you still paying attention will note that if handled as expressions (such as by a database), these represent the same value. HttpMessage msg4 = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg4, param, modifiedParamValue); sendAndReceive(msg4); countExpressionBasedRequests++; String modifiedExpressionOutputUnstripped = msg4.getResponseBody().toString(); String modifiedExpressionOutputStripped = this.stripOff(modifiedExpressionOutputUnstripped, modifiedParamValue); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output, and then the stripped output String normalBodyOutput[] = { mResBodyNormalUnstripped, mResBodyNormalStripped }; String expressionBodyOutput[] = { modifiedExpressionOutputUnstripped, modifiedExpressionOutputStripped }; boolean strippedOutput[] = { false, true }; for (int booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex = 0; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex < 2; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex++) { //if the results of the modified request match the original query, we may be onto something. if (expressionBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 4, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for modified expression parameter [" + modifiedParamValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //confirm that a different parameter value generates different output, to minimise false positives //get a value 3 sizes bigger this time int paramPlusFour = paramAsInt + 3; String modifiedParamValueConfirm = String.valueOf(paramPlusFour) + "-2"; //and prepare a request to set the parameter value to a string value like "4-2", if the original parameter value was "1" //Note that the two values are NOT equivalent, and the param value is different to the original HttpMessage msg4Confirm = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg4Confirm, param, modifiedParamValueConfirm); sendAndReceive(msg4Confirm); countExpressionBasedRequests++; String confirmExpressionOutputUnstripped = msg4Confirm.getResponseBody().toString(); String confirmExpressionOutputStripped = this .stripOff(confirmExpressionOutputUnstripped, modifiedParamValueConfirm); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output or the stripped output String confirmExpressionBodyOutput[] = { confirmExpressionOutputUnstripped, confirmExpressionOutputStripped }; if (confirmExpressionBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) != 0) { //the confirm query did not return the same results. This means that arbitrary queries are not all producing the same page output. //this means the fact we earier reproduced the original page output with a modified parameter was not a coincidence //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.expressionbased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, ""); else extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.expressionbased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, "NOT "); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = modifiedParamValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName(), getDescription(), null, //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg4); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; } } } } catch (Exception e) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The parameter value [" + TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + "] is NOT of type Integer"); //TODO: implement a similar check for string types? This probably need to be RDBMS specific (ie, it should not live in this scanner) } } //Check 2: boolean based checks. //the check goes like so: // append " and 1 = 1" to the param. Send the query. Check the results. Hopefully they match the original results from the unmodified query, // *suggesting* (but not yet definitely) that we have successfully modified the query, (hopefully not gotten an error message), // and have gotten the same results back, which is what you would expect if you added the constraint " and 1 = 1" to most (but not every) SQL query. // So was it a fluke that we got the same results back from the modified query? Perhaps the original query returned 0 rows, so adding any number of // constraints would change nothing? It is still a possibility! // check to see if we can change the original parameter again to *restrict* the scope of the query using an AND with an always false condition (AND_ERR) // (decreasing the results back to nothing), or to *broaden* the scope of the query using an OR with an always true condition (AND_OR) // (increasing the results). // If we can successfully alter the results to our requirements, by one means or another, we have found a SQL Injection vulnerability. //Some additional complications: assume there are 2 HTML parameters: username and password, and the SQL constructed is like so: // select * from username where user = "$user" and password = "$password" // and lets assume we successfully know the type of the user field, via SQL_OR_TRUE value '" OR "1"="1' (single quotes not part of the value) // we still have the problem that the actual SQL executed would look like so: // select * from username where user = "" OR "1"="1" and password = "whateveritis" // Since the password field is still taken into account (by virtue of the AND condition on the password column), and we only inject one parameter at a time, // we are still not in control. // the solution is simple: add an end-of-line comment to the field added in (in this example: the user field), so that the SQL becomes: // select * from username where user = "" OR "1"="1" -- and password = "whateveritis" // the result is that any additional constraints are commented out, and the last condition to have any effect is the one whose // HTTP param we are manipulating. // Note also that because this comment only needs to be added to the "SQL_OR_TRUE" and not to the equivalent SQL_AND_FALSE, because of the nature of the OR // and AND conditions in SQL. // Corollary: If a particular RDBMS does not offer the ability to comment out the remainder of a line, we will not attempt to comment out anything in the query // and we will simply hope that the *last* constraint in the SQL query is constructed from a HTTP parameter under our control. if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Doing Check 2, since check 1 did not match for " + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI()); //Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) //then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original query was last run (could be hours ago) //so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. //Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage); //String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); //boolean booleanBasedSqlInjectionFoundForParam = false; //try each of the AND syntax values in turn. //Which one is successful will depend on the column type of the table/view column into which we are injecting the SQL. for (int i = 0; i < SQL_LOGIC_AND_TRUE.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doBooleanBased && countBooleanBasedRequests < doBooleanMaxRequests; i++) { //needs a new message for each type of AND to be issued HttpMessage msg2 = getNewMsg(); String sqlBooleanAndTrueValue = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + SQL_LOGIC_AND_TRUE[i]; String sqlBooleanAndFalseValue = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + SQL_LOGIC_AND_FALSE[i]; setParameter(msg2, param, sqlBooleanAndTrueValue); //send the AND with an additional TRUE statement tacked onto the end. Hopefully it will return the same results as the original (to find a vulnerability) sendAndReceive(msg2); countBooleanBasedRequests++; //String resBodyAND = msg2.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDTrueUnstripped = msg2.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDTrueStripped = this.stripOff(resBodyANDTrueUnstripped, sqlBooleanAndTrueValue); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output, and then the stripped output String normalBodyOutput[] = { mResBodyNormalUnstripped, mResBodyNormalStripped }; String andTrueBodyOutput[] = { resBodyANDTrueUnstripped, resBodyANDTrueStripped }; boolean strippedOutput[] = { false, true }; for (int booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex = 0; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex < 2; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex++) { //if the results of the "AND 1=1" match the original query (using either the stipped or unstripped versions), we may be onto something. if (andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND TRUE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndTrueValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //so they match. Was it a fluke? See if we get the same result by tacking on "AND 1 = 2" to the original HttpMessage msg2_and_false = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg2_and_false, param, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue); sendAndReceive(msg2_and_false); countBooleanBasedRequests++; //String resBodyANDFalse = stripOff(msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(), SQL_LOGIC_AND_FALSE[i]); //String resBodyANDFalse = msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDFalseUnstripped = msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDFalseStripped = this.stripOff(resBodyANDFalseUnstripped, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue); String andFalseBodyOutput[] = { resBodyANDFalseUnstripped, resBodyANDFalseStripped }; //which AND False output should we compare? the stripped or the unstripped version? //depends on which one we used to get to here.. use the same as that.. // build an always false AND query. Result should be different to prove the SQL works. if (andFalseBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) != 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND FALSE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndFalseValue + "] differed from (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //it's different (suggesting that the "AND 1 = 2" appended on gave different results because it restricted the data set to nothing //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue, ""); else extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue, "NOT "); extraInfo = extraInfo + "\n" + Constant.messages .getString("ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo.dataexists"); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlBooleanAndTrueValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName(), getDescription(), null, //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg2); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; continue; //to the next entry in SQL_AND } else { //the results of the always false condition are the same as for the original unmodified parameter //this could be because there was *no* data returned for the original unmodified parameter //so consider the effect of adding comments to both the always true condition, and the always false condition //the first value to try.. String orValue = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + SQL_LOGIC_OR_TRUE[i]; //this is where that comment comes in handy: if the RDBMS supports one-line comments, add one in to attempt to ensure that the //condition becomes one that is effectively always true, returning ALL data (or as much as possible), allowing us to pinpoint the SQL Injection if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 2 , " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND FALSE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndFalseValue + "] SAME as (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI() + " ### (forcing OR TRUE check) "); HttpMessage msg2_or_true = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg2_or_true, param, orValue); sendAndReceive(msg2_or_true); countBooleanBasedRequests++; //String resBodyORTrue = stripOff(msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(), orValue); //String resBodyORTrue = msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyORTrueUnstripped = msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyORTrueStripped = this.stripOff(resBodyORTrueUnstripped, orValue); String orTrueBodyOutput[] = { resBodyORTrueUnstripped, resBodyORTrueStripped }; int compareOrToOriginal = orTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]); if (compareOrToOriginal != 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for OR TRUE condition [" + orValue + "] different to (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //it's different (suggesting that the "OR 1 = 1" appended on gave different results because it broadened the data set from nothing to something //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, orValue, ""); else extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, orValue, "NOT "); extraInfo = extraInfo + "\n" + Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo.datanotexists"); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = orValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName(), getDescription(), null, //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg2); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; //booleanBasedSqlInjectionFoundForParam = true; //causes us to skip past the other entries in SQL_AND. Only one will expose a vuln for a given param, since the database column is of only 1 type continue; } } } //if the results of the "AND 1=1" match the original query, we may be onto something. else { //andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) //the results of the "AND 1=1" do NOT match the original query, for whatever reason (no sql injection, or the web page is not stable) if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND condition [" + sqlBooleanAndTrueValue + "] does NOT match the (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); Patch diffpatch = DiffUtils.diff( new LinkedList<String>(Arrays .asList(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].split("\\n"))), new LinkedList<String>(Arrays.asList( andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].split("\\n")))); //int numberofDifferences = diffpatch.getDeltas().size(); //and convert the list of patches to a String, joining using a newline StringBuilder tempDiff = new StringBuilder(250); for (Delta delta : diffpatch.getDeltas()) { String changeType = null; if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.CHANGE) changeType = "Changed Text"; else if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.DELETE) changeType = "Deleted Text"; else if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.INSERT) changeType = "Inserted text"; else changeType = "Unknown change type [" + delta.getType() + "]"; tempDiff.append("\n(" + changeType + ")\n"); //blank line before tempDiff.append("Output for Unmodified parameter: " + delta.getOriginal() + "\n"); tempDiff.append("Output for modified parameter: " + delta.getRevised() + "\n"); } log.debug("DIFFS: " + tempDiff); } } } //end of boolean logic output index (unstripped + stripped) } //end of check 2 //Check 3: UNION based //for each SQL UNION combination to try for (int sqlUnionStringIndex = 0; sqlUnionStringIndex < SQL_UNION_APPENDAGES.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doUnionBased && countUnionBasedRequests < doUnionMaxRequests; sqlUnionStringIndex++) { //new message for each value we attack with HttpMessage msg3 = getNewMsg(); String sqlUnionValue = origParamValue + SQL_UNION_APPENDAGES[sqlUnionStringIndex]; setParameter(msg3, param, sqlUnionValue); //send the message with the modified parameters sendAndReceive(msg3); countUnionBasedRequests++; //now check the results.. look first for UNION specific error messages in the output that were not there in the original output //and failing that, look for generic RDBMS specific error messages //TODO: maybe also try looking at a differentiation based approach?? Prone to false positives though. Iterator<String> errorPatternUnionIterator = SQL_UNION_ERROR_TO_DBMS.keySet().iterator(); while (errorPatternUnionIterator.hasNext() && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { String errorPatternKey = errorPatternUnionIterator.next(); String errorPatternRDBMS = SQL_UNION_ERROR_TO_DBMS.get(errorPatternKey); //Note: must escape the strings, in case they contain strings like "[Microsoft], which would be interpreted as regular character class regexps" Pattern errorPattern = Pattern.compile("\\Q" + errorPatternKey + "\\E", PATTERN_PARAM); //if the "error message" occurs in the result of sending the modified query, but did NOT occur in the original result of the original query //then we may may have a SQL Injection vulnerability StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); String sqlUnionBodyUnstripped = msg3.getResponseBody().toString(); String sqlUnionBodyStripped = this.stripOff(sqlUnionBodyUnstripped, sqlUnionValue); Matcher matcherOrig = errorPattern.matcher(mResBodyNormalStripped); Matcher matcherSQLUnion = errorPattern.matcher(sqlUnionBodyStripped); boolean patternInOrig = matcherOrig.find(); boolean patternInSQLUnion = matcherSQLUnion.find(); //if (! matchBodyPattern(getBaseMsg(), errorPattern, null) && matchBodyPattern(msg3, errorPattern, sb)) { if (!patternInOrig && patternInSQLUnion) { //Likely a UNION Based SQL Injection (by error message). Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.unionbased.extrainfo", errorPatternRDBMS, errorPatternKey); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlUnionValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName() + " - " + errorPatternRDBMS, getDescription(), refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg3); //log it, as the RDBMS may be useful to know later (in subsequent checks, when we need to determine RDBMS specific behaviour, for instance) getKb().add(refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI(), "sql/" + errorPatternRDBMS, Boolean.TRUE); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; continue; } } //end of the loop to check for RDBMS specific UNION error messages } ////for each SQL UNION combination to try //end of check 3 //############################### //check for columns used in the "order by" clause of a SQL statement. earlier tests will likely not catch these //append on " ASC -- " to the end of the original parameter. Grab the results. //if the results are different to the original (unmodified parameter) results, then bale //if the results are the same as for the original parameter value, then the parameter *might* be influencing the order by // try again for "DESC": append on " DESC -- " to the end of the original parameter. Grab the results. // if the results are the same as the original (unmodified parameter) results, then bale // (the results are not under our control, or there is no difference in the ordering, for some reason: 0 or 1 rows only, or ordering // by the first column alone is not sufficient to change the ordering of the data.) // if the results were different to the original (unmodified parameter) results, then // SQL injection!! //Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) //then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original query was last run (could be hours ago) //so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. //Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage); //String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); if (!sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doOrderByBased && countOrderByBasedRequests < doOrderByMaxRequests) { String modifiedParamValue = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + " ASC " + SQL_ONE_LINE_COMMENT; HttpMessage msg5 = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg5, param, modifiedParamValue); sendAndReceive(msg5); countOrderByBasedRequests++; String modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped = msg5.getResponseBody().toString(); String modifiedAscendingOutputStripped = this.stripOff(modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped, modifiedParamValue); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output, and then the stripped output String normalBodyOutput[] = { mResBodyNormalUnstripped, mResBodyNormalStripped }; String ascendingBodyOutput[] = { modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped, modifiedAscendingOutputStripped }; boolean strippedOutput[] = { false, true }; for (int booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex = 0; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex < 2; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex++) { //if the results of the modified request match the original query, we may be onto something. if (ascendingBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check X, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for modified Order By parameter [" + modifiedParamValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //confirm that a different parameter value generates different output, to minimise false positives //use the descending order this time String modifiedParamValueConfirm = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + " DESC " + SQL_ONE_LINE_COMMENT; HttpMessage msg5Confirm = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg5Confirm, param, modifiedParamValueConfirm); sendAndReceive(msg5Confirm); countOrderByBasedRequests++; String confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped = msg5Confirm.getResponseBody().toString(); String confirmOrderByOutputStripped = this.stripOff(confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped, modifiedParamValueConfirm); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output or the stripped output String confirmOrderByBodyOutput[] = { confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped, confirmOrderByOutputStripped }; if (confirmOrderByBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) != 0) { //the confirm query did not return the same results. This means that arbitrary queries are not all producing the same page output. //this means the fact we earlier reproduced the original page output with a modified parameter was not a coincidence //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.orderbybased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, ""); else extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.orderbybased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, "NOT "); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = modifiedParamValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName(), getDescription(), null, //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg5); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; } } } } //############################### //if a sql injection was found, we should check if the page is flagged as a login page //in any of the contexts. if it is, raise an "SQL Injection - Authentication Bypass" alert in addition to the alerts already raised if (sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { boolean loginUrl = false; //log.debug("### A SQL Injection may lead to auth bypass.."); //are we dealing with a login url in any of the contexts? ExtensionAuth extAuth = (ExtensionAuth) Control.getSingleton().getExtensionLoader() .getExtension(ExtensionAuth.NAME); URI requestUri = getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI(); //using the session, get the list of contexts for the url List<Context> contextList = extAuth.getModel().getSession().getContextsForUrl(requestUri.getURI()); //now loop, and see if the url is a login url in each of the contexts in turn.. for (Context context : contextList) { HttpMessage loginRequest = extAuth.getApi().getLoginRequest(context.getIndex()); if (loginRequest != null) { URI loginUri = loginRequest.getRequestHeader().getURI(); if (requestUri.getScheme().equals(loginUri.getScheme()) && requestUri.getHost().equals(loginUri.getHost()) && requestUri.getPort() == loginUri.getPort() && requestUri.getPath().equals(loginUri.getPath())) { //we got this far.. only the method (GET/POST), user details, query params, fragment, and POST params //are possibly different from the login page. loginUrl = true; //DEBUG only //log.debug("##### The right login page was found"); break; } else { //log.debug("#### This is not the login page you're looking for"); } } else { //log.debug("### This context has no login page set"); } } if (loginUrl) { //log.debug("##### Raising auth bypass"); //raise the alert, using the custom name and description String vulnname = Constant.messages.getString("ascanrules.sqlinjection.authbypass.name"); String vulndesc = Constant.messages.getString("ascanrules.sqlinjection.authbypass.desc"); //raise the alert, using the attack string stored earlier for this purpose bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, vulnname, vulndesc, refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, "", getSolution(), getBaseMsg()); } //not a login page } //no sql Injection Found For Url } catch (Exception e) { //Do not try to internationalise this.. we need an error message in any event.. //if it's in English, it's still better than not having it at all. log.error("An error occurred checking a url for SQL Injection vulnerabilities", e); } }
From source file:davmail.exchange.ExchangeSession.java
protected String getAbsoluteUri(HttpMethod method, String path) throws URIException { URI uri = method.getURI(); if (path != null) { // reset query string uri.setQuery(null);/*from w w w . ja v a 2 s . c o m*/ if (path.startsWith("/")) { // path is absolute, replace method path uri.setPath(path); } else if (path.startsWith("http://") || path.startsWith("https://")) { return path; } else { // relative path, build new path String currentPath = method.getPath(); int end = currentPath.lastIndexOf('/'); if (end >= 0) { uri.setPath(currentPath.substring(0, end + 1) + path); } else { throw new URIException(uri.getURI()); } } } return uri.getURI(); }
From source file:davmail.exchange.ExchangeSession.java
protected String getScriptBasedFormURL(HttpMethod initmethod, String pathQuery) throws URIException { URI initmethodURI = initmethod.getURI(); int queryIndex = pathQuery.indexOf('?'); if (queryIndex >= 0) { if (queryIndex > 0) { // update path String newPath = pathQuery.substring(0, queryIndex); if (newPath.startsWith("/")) { // absolute path initmethodURI.setPath(newPath); } else { String currentPath = initmethodURI.getPath(); int folderIndex = currentPath.lastIndexOf('/'); if (folderIndex >= 0) { // replace relative path initmethodURI.setPath(currentPath.substring(0, folderIndex + 1) + newPath); } else { // should not happen initmethodURI.setPath('/' + newPath); }/*from ww w. j a v a 2s .c o m*/ } } initmethodURI.setQuery(pathQuery.substring(queryIndex + 1)); } return initmethodURI.getURI(); }
From source file:nl.nn.adapterframework.util.SsoUtil.java
public static void addSsoCredential(HttpMethod method, HttpState state, String defaultForwardHost) { try {/* ww w.jav a 2 s.co m*/ String name = SsoUtil.getSsoTokenName(); String value = SsoUtil.getSsoToken(); if (StringUtils.isEmpty(value)) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("no value for SsoCredential [" + name + "]"); } else { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("constructing SsoCredentialCookie [" + name + "]"); Cookie ssoCookie = new Cookie(); ssoCookie.setName(name); ssoCookie.setValue(value); String forwardHost; try { URI uri = method.getURI(); forwardHost = uri.getHost(); if (StringUtils.isEmpty(forwardHost)) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("did not find host from URI [" + uri.getURI() + "], will use default [" + defaultForwardHost + "] for SSO credential cookie"); forwardHost = defaultForwardHost; } } catch (Throwable t) { log.warn("could not extract host from URI", t); forwardHost = defaultForwardHost; } ssoCookie.setDomain(forwardHost); // path must have a value, otherwise cookie is not appended to request ssoCookie.setPath("/"); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("set SSOcookie attributes: domain [" + ssoCookie.getDomain() + "] path [" + ssoCookie.getPath() + "]"); state.addCookie(ssoCookie); } } catch (Exception e) { log.warn("could not obtain SsoToken: " + e.getMessage()); } }
From source file:org.andrewberman.sync.InheritMe.java
static String relativeToAbsoluteURL(String base, String href) throws Exception { // System.out.println(href); href = StringEscapeUtils.unescapeHtml(href); // System.out.println(href); href = urlEncoder.decode(href);// w w w. j ava2s .c om // System.out.println(href); base = StringEscapeUtils.unescapeHtml(base); base = urlEncoder.decode(base); URI baseURI = new URI(base, false); URI childURI = new URI(baseURI, href, false); // System.out.println(childURI.toString()); return childURI.getURI(); // return childURI.toString(); }
From source file:org.glite.slcs.shibclient.ShibbolethClient.java
/** * Authenticates the user on his IdP for the given SP. * /*from w w w . j ava 2 s. c om*/ * @param spEntryURL * The Service Provider entry point URL * @return <code>true</code> iff the user have been authenticated by his * Identity Provider. * @throws AuthException * @throws RemoteException * @throws ServiceException * @throws UnknownResourceException */ public boolean authenticate(String spEntryURL) throws AuthException, RemoteException, ServiceException, UnknownResourceException { String idpProviderID = credentials_.getIdentityProviderID(); IdentityProvider idp = metadata_.getIdentityProvider(idpProviderID); if (idp == null) { throw new UnknownResourceException("IdP " + idpProviderID + " not found in Metadata"); } LOG.info(spEntryURL + " IdP=" + idp.getUrl() + " AuthType=" + idp.getAuthTypeName()); try { URI idpSSOResponseURI = null; // 1. get the first redirection, or the SAML2 DS response, or the // same // (already authN) URI spLoginResponseURI = processSPEntry(spEntryURL, idp); // either wayf or idp or same (already authenticated) String spLoginResponseURL = spLoginResponseURI.getEscapedURI(); LOG.debug("spLoginResponseURL=" + spLoginResponseURL); // check if already authenticated (multiple call to authenticate) if (spLoginResponseURL.startsWith(spEntryURL)) { LOG.info("Already authenticated? " + isAuthenticated_ + ": " + spLoginResponseURL); return this.isAuthenticated_; } // 2. process the IdP SSO login idpSSOResponseURI = processIdPSSO(idp, spLoginResponseURI); // 3. process the IdP SSO response -> Artifact or Browser/POST // profile URI idpResponseURI = processIdPSSOResponse(idp, idpSSOResponseURI); String url = idpResponseURI.getURI(); if (url.equals(spEntryURL)) { this.isAuthenticated_ = true; LOG.info("Sucessful authentication"); } } catch (URIException e) { LOG.error("URIException: " + e); e.printStackTrace(); } catch (HttpException e) { LOG.error("HttpException: " + e); e.printStackTrace(); } catch (IOException e) { LOG.error("IOException: " + e); e.printStackTrace(); throw new RemoteException(e); } return this.isAuthenticated_; }