List of usage examples for org.apache.commons.httpclient URI getScheme
public String getScheme()
From source file:com.eviware.soapui.impl.support.HttpUtils.java
public static java.net.URI createUri(URI uri) throws URISyntaxException, URIException { return createUri(uri.getScheme(), uri.getUserinfo(), uri.getHost(), uri.getPort(), uri.getEscapedPath(), uri.getEscapedQuery(), uri.getEscapedFragment()); }
From source file:com.limegroup.gnutella.licenses.LicenseFactory.java
/** Gets a CC license URI from the given license string. */ private static URI getCCLicenseURI(String license) { // find where the URL should begin. int verifyAt = license.indexOf(CCConstants.URL_INDICATOR); if (verifyAt == -1) return null; int urlStart = verifyAt + CCConstants.URL_INDICATOR.length(); if (urlStart >= license.length()) return null; String url = license.substring(urlStart).trim(); URI uri = null; try {//from ww w .java 2 s. c o m uri = new URI(url.toCharArray()); // Make sure the scheme is HTTP. String scheme = uri.getScheme(); if (scheme == null || !scheme.equalsIgnoreCase("http")) throw new URIException("Invalid scheme: " + scheme); // Make sure the scheme has some authority. String authority = uri.getAuthority(); if (authority == null || authority.equals("") || authority.indexOf(' ') != -1) throw new URIException("Invalid authority: " + authority); } catch (URIException e) { uri = null; LOG.error("Unable to create URI", e); } return uri; }
From source file:com.eviware.soapui.impl.wsdl.submit.filters.EndpointRequestFilter.java
@Override public void filterAbstractHttpRequest(SubmitContext context, AbstractHttpRequest<?> request) { HttpRequestBase httpMethod = (HttpRequestBase) context.getProperty(BaseHttpRequestTransport.HTTP_METHOD); String strURL = request.getEndpoint(); strURL = PropertyExpander.expandProperties(context, strURL); try {//ww w .j a v a 2 s . co m if (StringUtils.hasContent(strURL)) { URI uri = new URI(strURL, request.getSettings().getBoolean(HttpSettings.ENCODED_URLS)); context.setProperty(BaseHttpRequestTransport.REQUEST_URI, uri); httpMethod.setURI(new java.net.URI(uri.getScheme(), uri.getUserinfo(), uri.getHost(), uri.getPort(), (uri.getPath()) == null ? "/" : uri.getPath(), uri.getQuery(), uri.getFragment())); } } catch (Exception e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } }
From source file:com.eviware.soapui.impl.wsdl.submit.transports.http.HttpClientRequestTransport.java
private ExtendedGetMethod followRedirects(HttpClient httpClient, int redirectCount, ExtendedHttpMethod httpMethod, org.apache.http.HttpResponse httpResponse, HttpContext httpContext) throws Exception { ExtendedGetMethod getMethod = new ExtendedGetMethod(); getMethod.getMetrics().getTotalTimer().set(httpMethod.getMetrics().getTotalTimer().getStart(), httpMethod.getMetrics().getTotalTimer().getStop()); getMethod.getMetrics().setHttpMethod(httpMethod.getMethod()); captureMetrics(httpMethod, httpClient); String location = httpResponse.getFirstHeader("Location").getValue(); URI uri = new URI(new URI(httpMethod.getURI().toString(), true), location, true); java.net.URI newUri = new java.net.URI(uri.getScheme(), uri.getUserinfo(), uri.getHost(), uri.getPort(), uri.getPath(), uri.getQuery(), uri.getFragment()); getMethod.setURI(newUri);/*from www . j a v a 2s .co m*/ org.apache.http.HttpResponse response = HttpClientSupport.execute(getMethod, httpContext); if (isRedirectResponse(response.getStatusLine().getStatusCode())) { if (redirectCount == 10) throw new Exception("Maximum number of Redirects reached [10]"); try { getMethod = followRedirects(httpClient, redirectCount + 1, getMethod, response, httpContext); } finally { //getMethod.releaseConnection(); } } for (Header header : httpMethod.getAllHeaders()) getMethod.addHeader(header); return getMethod; }
From source file:de.innovationgate.utils.URLBuilder.java
/** * Creates a URLBuilder that parses an existing URI * @param uri The URI to parse/* ww w .j a v a 2 s. co m*/ */ public URLBuilder(URI uri) throws URIException { this(uri.getScheme(), uri.getPort(), uri.getHost(), uri.getPath(), uri.getQuery(), uri.getFragment(), "UTF-8"); }
From source file:de.innovationgate.utils.URLBuilder.java
/** * Creates a URLBuilder that parses an existing URI * @param uri The URI to parse/* w ww . j a v a 2 s. c o m*/ * @param encoding The encoding of URL parameters. The URLBuilder will decode them. */ public URLBuilder(URI uri, String encoding) throws URIException { this(uri.getScheme(), uri.getPort(), uri.getHost(), uri.getPath(), uri.getQuery(), uri.getFragment(), encoding); }
From source file:com.eviware.soapui.impl.wsdl.submit.filters.HttpRequestFilter.java
@SuppressWarnings("deprecation") @Override//from www . j ava 2 s . co m public void filterHttpRequest(SubmitContext context, HttpRequestInterface<?> request) { HttpRequestBase httpMethod = (HttpRequestBase) context.getProperty(BaseHttpRequestTransport.HTTP_METHOD); String path = PropertyExpander.expandProperties(context, request.getPath()); StringBuffer query = new StringBuffer(); String encoding = System.getProperty("soapui.request.encoding", StringUtils.unquote(request.getEncoding())); StringToStringMap responseProperties = (StringToStringMap) context .getProperty(BaseHttpRequestTransport.RESPONSE_PROPERTIES); MimeMultipart formMp = "multipart/form-data".equals(request.getMediaType()) && httpMethod instanceof HttpEntityEnclosingRequestBase ? new MimeMultipart() : null; RestParamsPropertyHolder params = request.getParams(); for (int c = 0; c < params.getPropertyCount(); c++) { RestParamProperty param = params.getPropertyAt(c); String value = PropertyExpander.expandProperties(context, param.getValue()); responseProperties.put(param.getName(), value); List<String> valueParts = sendEmptyParameters(request) || (!StringUtils.hasContent(value) && param.getRequired()) ? RestUtils.splitMultipleParametersEmptyIncluded(value, request.getMultiValueDelimiter()) : RestUtils.splitMultipleParameters(value, request.getMultiValueDelimiter()); // skip HEADER and TEMPLATE parameter encoding (TEMPLATE is encoded by // the URI handling further down) if (value != null && param.getStyle() != ParameterStyle.HEADER && param.getStyle() != ParameterStyle.TEMPLATE && !param.isDisableUrlEncoding()) { try { if (StringUtils.hasContent(encoding)) { value = URLEncoder.encode(value, encoding); for (int i = 0; i < valueParts.size(); i++) valueParts.set(i, URLEncoder.encode(valueParts.get(i), encoding)); } else { value = URLEncoder.encode(value); for (int i = 0; i < valueParts.size(); i++) valueParts.set(i, URLEncoder.encode(valueParts.get(i))); } } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e1) { SoapUI.logError(e1); value = URLEncoder.encode(value); for (int i = 0; i < valueParts.size(); i++) valueParts.set(i, URLEncoder.encode(valueParts.get(i))); } // URLEncoder replaces space with "+", but we want "%20". value = value.replaceAll("\\+", "%20"); for (int i = 0; i < valueParts.size(); i++) valueParts.set(i, valueParts.get(i).replaceAll("\\+", "%20")); } if (param.getStyle() == ParameterStyle.QUERY && !sendEmptyParameters(request)) { if (!StringUtils.hasContent(value) && !param.getRequired()) continue; } switch (param.getStyle()) { case HEADER: for (String valuePart : valueParts) httpMethod.addHeader(param.getName(), valuePart); break; case QUERY: if (formMp == null || !request.isPostQueryString()) { for (String valuePart : valueParts) { if (query.length() > 0) query.append('&'); query.append(URLEncoder.encode(param.getName())); query.append('='); if (StringUtils.hasContent(valuePart)) query.append(valuePart); } } else { try { addFormMultipart(request, formMp, param.getName(), responseProperties.get(param.getName())); } catch (MessagingException e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } } break; case TEMPLATE: try { value = getEncodedValue(value, encoding, param.isDisableUrlEncoding(), request.getSettings().getBoolean(HttpSettings.ENCODED_URLS)); path = path.replaceAll("\\{" + param.getName() + "\\}", value == null ? "" : value); } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } break; case MATRIX: try { value = getEncodedValue(value, encoding, param.isDisableUrlEncoding(), request.getSettings().getBoolean(HttpSettings.ENCODED_URLS)); } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } if (param.getType().equals(XmlBoolean.type.getName())) { if (value.toUpperCase().equals("TRUE") || value.equals("1")) { path += ";" + param.getName(); } } else { path += ";" + param.getName(); if (StringUtils.hasContent(value)) { path += "=" + value; } } case PLAIN: break; } } if (request.getSettings().getBoolean(HttpSettings.FORWARD_SLASHES)) path = PathUtils.fixForwardSlashesInPath(path); if (PathUtils.isHttpPath(path)) { try { // URI(String) automatically URLencodes the input, so we need to // decode it first... URI uri = new URI(path, request.getSettings().getBoolean(HttpSettings.ENCODED_URLS)); context.setProperty(BaseHttpRequestTransport.REQUEST_URI, uri); java.net.URI oldUri = httpMethod.getURI(); httpMethod.setURI(new java.net.URI(oldUri.getScheme(), oldUri.getUserInfo(), oldUri.getHost(), oldUri.getPort(), (uri.getPath()) == null ? "/" : uri.getPath(), oldUri.getQuery(), oldUri.getFragment())); } catch (Exception e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } } else if (StringUtils.hasContent(path)) { try { java.net.URI oldUri = httpMethod.getURI(); String pathToSet = StringUtils.hasContent(oldUri.getRawPath()) && !"/".equals(oldUri.getRawPath()) ? oldUri.getRawPath() + path : path; java.net.URI newUri = URIUtils.createURI(oldUri.getScheme(), oldUri.getHost(), oldUri.getPort(), pathToSet, oldUri.getQuery(), oldUri.getFragment()); httpMethod.setURI(newUri); context.setProperty(BaseHttpRequestTransport.REQUEST_URI, new URI(newUri.toString(), request.getSettings().getBoolean(HttpSettings.ENCODED_URLS))); } catch (Exception e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } } if (query.length() > 0 && !request.isPostQueryString()) { try { java.net.URI oldUri = httpMethod.getURI(); httpMethod.setURI(URIUtils.createURI(oldUri.getScheme(), oldUri.getHost(), oldUri.getPort(), oldUri.getRawPath(), query.toString(), oldUri.getFragment())); } catch (Exception e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } } if (request instanceof RestRequest) { String acceptEncoding = ((RestRequest) request).getAccept(); if (StringUtils.hasContent(acceptEncoding)) { httpMethod.setHeader("Accept", acceptEncoding); } } if (formMp != null) { // create request message try { if (request.hasRequestBody() && httpMethod instanceof HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) { String requestContent = PropertyExpander.expandProperties(context, request.getRequestContent(), request.isEntitizeProperties()); if (StringUtils.hasContent(requestContent)) { initRootPart(request, requestContent, formMp); } } for (Attachment attachment : request.getAttachments()) { MimeBodyPart part = new PreencodedMimeBodyPart("binary"); if (attachment instanceof FileAttachment<?>) { String name = attachment.getName(); if (StringUtils.hasContent(attachment.getContentID()) && !name.equals(attachment.getContentID())) name = attachment.getContentID(); part.setDisposition( "form-data; name=\"" + name + "\"; filename=\"" + attachment.getName() + "\""); } else part.setDisposition("form-data; name=\"" + attachment.getName() + "\""); part.setDataHandler(new DataHandler(new AttachmentDataSource(attachment))); formMp.addBodyPart(part); } MimeMessage message = new MimeMessage(AttachmentUtils.JAVAMAIL_SESSION); message.setContent(formMp); message.saveChanges(); RestRequestMimeMessageRequestEntity mimeMessageRequestEntity = new RestRequestMimeMessageRequestEntity( message, request); ((HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) httpMethod).setEntity(mimeMessageRequestEntity); httpMethod.setHeader("Content-Type", mimeMessageRequestEntity.getContentType().getValue()); httpMethod.setHeader("MIME-Version", "1.0"); } catch (Throwable e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } } else if (request.hasRequestBody() && httpMethod instanceof HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) { if (StringUtils.hasContent(request.getMediaType())) httpMethod.setHeader("Content-Type", getContentTypeHeader(request.getMediaType(), encoding)); if (request.isPostQueryString()) { try { ((HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) httpMethod).setEntity(new StringEntity(query.toString())); } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } } else { String requestContent = PropertyExpander.expandProperties(context, request.getRequestContent(), request.isEntitizeProperties()); List<Attachment> attachments = new ArrayList<Attachment>(); for (Attachment attachment : request.getAttachments()) { if (attachment.getContentType().equals(request.getMediaType())) { attachments.add(attachment); } } if (StringUtils.hasContent(requestContent) && attachments.isEmpty()) { try { byte[] content = encoding == null ? requestContent.getBytes() : requestContent.getBytes(encoding); ((HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) httpMethod).setEntity(new ByteArrayEntity(content)); } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { ((HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) httpMethod) .setEntity(new ByteArrayEntity(requestContent.getBytes())); } } else if (attachments.size() > 0) { try { MimeMultipart mp = null; if (StringUtils.hasContent(requestContent)) { mp = new MimeMultipart(); initRootPart(request, requestContent, mp); } else if (attachments.size() == 1) { ((HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) httpMethod) .setEntity(new InputStreamEntity(attachments.get(0).getInputStream(), -1)); httpMethod.setHeader("Content-Type", getContentTypeHeader(request.getMediaType(), encoding)); } if (((HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) httpMethod).getEntity() == null) { if (mp == null) mp = new MimeMultipart(); // init mimeparts AttachmentUtils.addMimeParts(request, attachments, mp, new StringToStringMap()); // create request message MimeMessage message = new MimeMessage(AttachmentUtils.JAVAMAIL_SESSION); message.setContent(mp); message.saveChanges(); RestRequestMimeMessageRequestEntity mimeMessageRequestEntity = new RestRequestMimeMessageRequestEntity( message, request); ((HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) httpMethod).setEntity(mimeMessageRequestEntity); httpMethod.setHeader("Content-Type", getContentTypeHeader( mimeMessageRequestEntity.getContentType().getValue(), encoding)); httpMethod.setHeader("MIME-Version", "1.0"); } } catch (Exception e) { SoapUI.logError(e); } } } } }
From source file:com.cyberway.issue.net.UURIFactory.java
/** * If http(s) scheme, check scheme specific part begins '//'. * @throws URIException /* w ww . ja v a 2s.c om*/ * @see http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1738.html Section 3.1. Common Internet * Scheme Syntax */ protected void checkHttpSchemeSpecificPartSlashPrefix(final URI base, final String scheme, final String schemeSpecificPart) throws URIException { if (scheme == null || scheme.length() <= 0) { return; } if (!scheme.equals("http") && !scheme.equals("https")) { return; } if (schemeSpecificPart == null || !schemeSpecificPart.startsWith("//")) { // only acceptable if schemes match if (base == null || !scheme.equals(base.getScheme())) { throw new URIException("relative URI with scheme only allowed for " + "scheme matching base"); } return; } if (schemeSpecificPart.length() <= 2) { throw new URIException("http scheme specific part is " + "too short: " + schemeSpecificPart); } }
From source file:com.twinsoft.convertigo.beans.connectors.HttpConnector.java
private String getAbsoluteUrl(HttpMethod method, String givenUrl) throws URIException, MalformedURLException, EngineException { String absoluteUrl = givenUrl; if (method != null) { if (givenUrl != null) { // givenUrl is already absolute if (givenUrl.startsWith("http")) { absoluteUrl = givenUrl;// w ww . j ava 2 s.c om URL url = null; String host = ""; int port = -1; if (absoluteUrl.toLowerCase().startsWith("https:")) { if (!https) { Engine.logBeans.debug("(HttpConnector) Setting up SSL properties"); certificateManager.collectStoreInformation(context); } url = new URL(absoluteUrl); host = url.getHost(); port = url.getPort(); if (port == -1) port = 443; Engine.logBeans.debug("(HttpConnector) Host: " + host + ":" + port); Engine.logBeans.debug( "(HttpConnector) CertificateManager has changed: " + certificateManager.hasChanged); if (certificateManager.hasChanged || (!host.equalsIgnoreCase(hostConfiguration.getHost())) || (hostConfiguration.getPort() != port)) { Engine.logBeans .debug("(HttpConnector) Using MySSLSocketFactory for creating the SSL socket"); Protocol myhttps = new Protocol("https", MySSLSocketFactory.getSSLSocketFactory(certificateManager.keyStore, certificateManager.keyStorePassword, certificateManager.trustStore, certificateManager.trustStorePassword, this.trustAllServerCertificates), port); hostConfiguration.setHost(host, port, myhttps); } // absoluteUrl = url.getFile(); Engine.logBeans.debug("(HttpConnector) Updated URL for SSL purposes: " + absoluteUrl); } else { url = new URL(absoluteUrl); host = url.getHost(); port = url.getPort(); Engine.logBeans.debug("(HttpConnector) Host: " + host + ":" + port); hostConfiguration.setHost(host, port); } } // givenUrl is relative to method uri ones else { URI uri = method.getURI(); String methodProtocol = uri.getScheme(); String methodHost = uri.getHost(); if (hostConfiguration.getProtocol().isSecure()) { return givenUrl.startsWith("/") ? givenUrl : ('/' + givenUrl); } int methodPort = uri.getPort(); String path = uri.getCurrentHierPath(); path = ((path.equals("/") ? "" : path)); absoluteUrl = methodProtocol + "://" + methodHost; if (methodPort != -1) { absoluteUrl += ":" + methodPort; } if (!givenUrl.startsWith("/") && (path.length() == 0 || !givenUrl.contains(path + "/"))) { absoluteUrl += path + "/" + givenUrl; } else { absoluteUrl += givenUrl; } } } } return absoluteUrl; }
From source file:de.kimminich.agile.demos.lecture4.TestSQLInjection.java
/** * scans for SQL Injection vulnerabilities *///w w w. jav a 2 s. com @Override public void scan(HttpMessage msg, String param, String origParamValue) { //Note: the "value" we are passed here is escaped. we need to unescape it before handling it. //as soon as we find a single SQL injection on the url, skip out. Do not look for SQL injection on a subsequent parameter on the same URL //for performance reasons. boolean sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = false; String sqlInjectionAttack = null; HttpMessage refreshedmessage = null; String mResBodyNormalUnstripped = null; String mResBodyNormalStripped = null; try { //reinitialise the count for each type of request, for each parameter. We will be sticking to limits defined in the attach strength logic int countErrorBasedRequests = 0; int countExpressionBasedRequests = 0; int countBooleanBasedRequests = 0; int countUnionBasedRequests = 0; int countOrderByBasedRequests = 0; int countStackedBasedRequests = 0; //TODO: use in the stacked based queries implementation //Check 1: Check for Error Based SQL Injection (actual error messages). //for each SQL metacharacter combination to try for (int sqlErrorStringIndex = 0; sqlErrorStringIndex < SQL_CHECK_ERR.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doErrorBased && countErrorBasedRequests < doErrorMaxRequests; sqlErrorStringIndex++) { //work through the attack using each of the following strings as a prefix: the empty string, and the original value //Note: this doubles the amount of work done by the scanner, but is necessary in some cases String[] prefixStrings; if (origParamValue != null) { prefixStrings = new String[] { "", TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) }; } else { prefixStrings = new String[] { "" }; } for (int prefixIndex = 0; prefixIndex < prefixStrings.length; prefixIndex++) { //new message for each value we attack with HttpMessage msg1 = getNewMsg(); String sqlErrValue = prefixStrings[prefixIndex] + SQL_CHECK_ERR[sqlErrorStringIndex]; setParameter(msg1, param, sqlErrValue); //System.out.println("Attacking [" + msg + "], parameter [" + param + "] with value ["+ sqlErrValue + "]"); //send the message with the modified parameters sendAndReceive(msg1); countErrorBasedRequests++; //now check the results against each pattern in turn, to try to identify a database, or even better: a specific database. //Note: do NOT check the HTTP error code just yet, as the result could come back with one of various codes. Iterator<String> errorPatternIterator = SQL_ERROR_TO_DBMS.keySet().iterator(); while (errorPatternIterator.hasNext() && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { String errorPatternKey = errorPatternIterator.next(); String errorPatternRDBMS = SQL_ERROR_TO_DBMS.get(errorPatternKey); //Note: must escape the strings, in case they contain strings like "[Microsoft], which would be interpreted as regular character class regexps" Pattern errorPattern = Pattern.compile("\\Q" + errorPatternKey + "\\E", PATTERN_PARAM); //if the "error message" occurs in the result of sending the modified query, but did NOT occur in the original result of the original query //then we may may have a SQL Injection vulnerability StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); if (!matchBodyPattern(getBaseMsg(), errorPattern, null) && matchBodyPattern(msg1, errorPattern, sb)) { //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.errorbased.extrainfo", errorPatternRDBMS, errorPatternKey); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlErrValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName() + " - " + errorPatternRDBMS, getDescription(), null, param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg1); //log it, as the RDBMS may be useful to know later (in subsequent checks, when we need to determine RDBMS specific behaviour, for instance) getKb().add(getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI(), "sql/" + errorPatternRDBMS, Boolean.TRUE); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; continue; } } //end of the loop to check for RDBMS specific error messages } //for each of the SQL_CHECK_ERR values (SQL metacharacters) } //############################### //Check 4 //New! I haven't seen this technique documented anywhere else, but it's dead simple. Let me explain. //See if the parameter value can simply be changed to one that *evaluates* to be the same value, //if evaluated on a database //the simple check is to see if parameter "1" gives the same results as for param "2-1", and different results for param "2-2" //for now, we try this for integer values only. //############################### //Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) //then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original query was last run (could be hours ago) //so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. //Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage); //String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); if (!sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doExpressionBased && countExpressionBasedRequests < doExpressionMaxRequests) { //first figure out the type of the parameter.. try { //is it an integer type? int paramAsInt = new Integer(TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue)); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The parameter value [" + TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + "] is of type Integer"); //get a value 2 sizes bigger int paramPlusTwo = paramAsInt + 2; String modifiedParamValue = String.valueOf(paramPlusTwo) + "-2"; //and prepare a request to set the parameter value to a string value like "3-2", if the original parameter value was "1" //those of you still paying attention will note that if handled as expressions (such as by a database), these represent the same value. HttpMessage msg4 = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg4, param, modifiedParamValue); sendAndReceive(msg4); countExpressionBasedRequests++; String modifiedExpressionOutputUnstripped = msg4.getResponseBody().toString(); String modifiedExpressionOutputStripped = this.stripOff(modifiedExpressionOutputUnstripped, modifiedParamValue); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output, and then the stripped output String normalBodyOutput[] = { mResBodyNormalUnstripped, mResBodyNormalStripped }; String expressionBodyOutput[] = { modifiedExpressionOutputUnstripped, modifiedExpressionOutputStripped }; boolean strippedOutput[] = { false, true }; for (int booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex = 0; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex < 2; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex++) { //if the results of the modified request match the original query, we may be onto something. if (expressionBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 4, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for modified expression parameter [" + modifiedParamValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //confirm that a different parameter value generates different output, to minimise false positives //get a value 3 sizes bigger this time int paramPlusFour = paramAsInt + 3; String modifiedParamValueConfirm = String.valueOf(paramPlusFour) + "-2"; //and prepare a request to set the parameter value to a string value like "4-2", if the original parameter value was "1" //Note that the two values are NOT equivalent, and the param value is different to the original HttpMessage msg4Confirm = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg4Confirm, param, modifiedParamValueConfirm); sendAndReceive(msg4Confirm); countExpressionBasedRequests++; String confirmExpressionOutputUnstripped = msg4Confirm.getResponseBody().toString(); String confirmExpressionOutputStripped = this .stripOff(confirmExpressionOutputUnstripped, modifiedParamValueConfirm); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output or the stripped output String confirmExpressionBodyOutput[] = { confirmExpressionOutputUnstripped, confirmExpressionOutputStripped }; if (confirmExpressionBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) != 0) { //the confirm query did not return the same results. This means that arbitrary queries are not all producing the same page output. //this means the fact we earier reproduced the original page output with a modified parameter was not a coincidence //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.expressionbased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, ""); else extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.expressionbased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, "NOT "); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = modifiedParamValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName(), getDescription(), null, //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg4); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; } } } } catch (Exception e) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The parameter value [" + TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + "] is NOT of type Integer"); //TODO: implement a similar check for string types? This probably need to be RDBMS specific (ie, it should not live in this scanner) } } //Check 2: boolean based checks. //the check goes like so: // append " and 1 = 1" to the param. Send the query. Check the results. Hopefully they match the original results from the unmodified query, // *suggesting* (but not yet definitely) that we have successfully modified the query, (hopefully not gotten an error message), // and have gotten the same results back, which is what you would expect if you added the constraint " and 1 = 1" to most (but not every) SQL query. // So was it a fluke that we got the same results back from the modified query? Perhaps the original query returned 0 rows, so adding any number of // constraints would change nothing? It is still a possibility! // check to see if we can change the original parameter again to *restrict* the scope of the query using an AND with an always false condition (AND_ERR) // (decreasing the results back to nothing), or to *broaden* the scope of the query using an OR with an always true condition (AND_OR) // (increasing the results). // If we can successfully alter the results to our requirements, by one means or another, we have found a SQL Injection vulnerability. //Some additional complications: assume there are 2 HTML parameters: username and password, and the SQL constructed is like so: // select * from username where user = "$user" and password = "$password" // and lets assume we successfully know the type of the user field, via SQL_OR_TRUE value '" OR "1"="1' (single quotes not part of the value) // we still have the problem that the actual SQL executed would look like so: // select * from username where user = "" OR "1"="1" and password = "whateveritis" // Since the password field is still taken into account (by virtue of the AND condition on the password column), and we only inject one parameter at a time, // we are still not in control. // the solution is simple: add an end-of-line comment to the field added in (in this example: the user field), so that the SQL becomes: // select * from username where user = "" OR "1"="1" -- and password = "whateveritis" // the result is that any additional constraints are commented out, and the last condition to have any effect is the one whose // HTTP param we are manipulating. // Note also that because this comment only needs to be added to the "SQL_OR_TRUE" and not to the equivalent SQL_AND_FALSE, because of the nature of the OR // and AND conditions in SQL. // Corollary: If a particular RDBMS does not offer the ability to comment out the remainder of a line, we will not attempt to comment out anything in the query // and we will simply hope that the *last* constraint in the SQL query is constructed from a HTTP parameter under our control. if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Doing Check 2, since check 1 did not match for " + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI()); //Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) //then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original query was last run (could be hours ago) //so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. //Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage); //String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); //boolean booleanBasedSqlInjectionFoundForParam = false; //try each of the AND syntax values in turn. //Which one is successful will depend on the column type of the table/view column into which we are injecting the SQL. for (int i = 0; i < SQL_LOGIC_AND_TRUE.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doBooleanBased && countBooleanBasedRequests < doBooleanMaxRequests; i++) { //needs a new message for each type of AND to be issued HttpMessage msg2 = getNewMsg(); String sqlBooleanAndTrueValue = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + SQL_LOGIC_AND_TRUE[i]; String sqlBooleanAndFalseValue = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + SQL_LOGIC_AND_FALSE[i]; setParameter(msg2, param, sqlBooleanAndTrueValue); //send the AND with an additional TRUE statement tacked onto the end. Hopefully it will return the same results as the original (to find a vulnerability) sendAndReceive(msg2); countBooleanBasedRequests++; //String resBodyAND = msg2.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDTrueUnstripped = msg2.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDTrueStripped = this.stripOff(resBodyANDTrueUnstripped, sqlBooleanAndTrueValue); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output, and then the stripped output String normalBodyOutput[] = { mResBodyNormalUnstripped, mResBodyNormalStripped }; String andTrueBodyOutput[] = { resBodyANDTrueUnstripped, resBodyANDTrueStripped }; boolean strippedOutput[] = { false, true }; for (int booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex = 0; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex < 2; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex++) { //if the results of the "AND 1=1" match the original query (using either the stipped or unstripped versions), we may be onto something. if (andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND TRUE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndTrueValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //so they match. Was it a fluke? See if we get the same result by tacking on "AND 1 = 2" to the original HttpMessage msg2_and_false = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg2_and_false, param, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue); sendAndReceive(msg2_and_false); countBooleanBasedRequests++; //String resBodyANDFalse = stripOff(msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(), SQL_LOGIC_AND_FALSE[i]); //String resBodyANDFalse = msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDFalseUnstripped = msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDFalseStripped = this.stripOff(resBodyANDFalseUnstripped, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue); String andFalseBodyOutput[] = { resBodyANDFalseUnstripped, resBodyANDFalseStripped }; //which AND False output should we compare? the stripped or the unstripped version? //depends on which one we used to get to here.. use the same as that.. // build an always false AND query. Result should be different to prove the SQL works. if (andFalseBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) != 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND FALSE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndFalseValue + "] differed from (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //it's different (suggesting that the "AND 1 = 2" appended on gave different results because it restricted the data set to nothing //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue, ""); else extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue, "NOT "); extraInfo = extraInfo + "\n" + Constant.messages .getString("ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo.dataexists"); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlBooleanAndTrueValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName(), getDescription(), null, //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg2); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; continue; //to the next entry in SQL_AND } else { //the results of the always false condition are the same as for the original unmodified parameter //this could be because there was *no* data returned for the original unmodified parameter //so consider the effect of adding comments to both the always true condition, and the always false condition //the first value to try.. String orValue = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + SQL_LOGIC_OR_TRUE[i]; //this is where that comment comes in handy: if the RDBMS supports one-line comments, add one in to attempt to ensure that the //condition becomes one that is effectively always true, returning ALL data (or as much as possible), allowing us to pinpoint the SQL Injection if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 2 , " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND FALSE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndFalseValue + "] SAME as (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI() + " ### (forcing OR TRUE check) "); HttpMessage msg2_or_true = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg2_or_true, param, orValue); sendAndReceive(msg2_or_true); countBooleanBasedRequests++; //String resBodyORTrue = stripOff(msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(), orValue); //String resBodyORTrue = msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyORTrueUnstripped = msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyORTrueStripped = this.stripOff(resBodyORTrueUnstripped, orValue); String orTrueBodyOutput[] = { resBodyORTrueUnstripped, resBodyORTrueStripped }; int compareOrToOriginal = orTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]); if (compareOrToOriginal != 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for OR TRUE condition [" + orValue + "] different to (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //it's different (suggesting that the "OR 1 = 1" appended on gave different results because it broadened the data set from nothing to something //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, orValue, ""); else extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, orValue, "NOT "); extraInfo = extraInfo + "\n" + Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.extrainfo.datanotexists"); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = orValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName(), getDescription(), null, //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg2); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; //booleanBasedSqlInjectionFoundForParam = true; //causes us to skip past the other entries in SQL_AND. Only one will expose a vuln for a given param, since the database column is of only 1 type continue; } } } //if the results of the "AND 1=1" match the original query, we may be onto something. else { //andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) //the results of the "AND 1=1" do NOT match the original query, for whatever reason (no sql injection, or the web page is not stable) if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND condition [" + sqlBooleanAndTrueValue + "] does NOT match the (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); Patch diffpatch = DiffUtils.diff( new LinkedList<String>(Arrays .asList(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].split("\\n"))), new LinkedList<String>(Arrays.asList( andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].split("\\n")))); //int numberofDifferences = diffpatch.getDeltas().size(); //and convert the list of patches to a String, joining using a newline StringBuilder tempDiff = new StringBuilder(250); for (Delta delta : diffpatch.getDeltas()) { String changeType = null; if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.CHANGE) changeType = "Changed Text"; else if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.DELETE) changeType = "Deleted Text"; else if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.INSERT) changeType = "Inserted text"; else changeType = "Unknown change type [" + delta.getType() + "]"; tempDiff.append("\n(" + changeType + ")\n"); //blank line before tempDiff.append("Output for Unmodified parameter: " + delta.getOriginal() + "\n"); tempDiff.append("Output for modified parameter: " + delta.getRevised() + "\n"); } log.debug("DIFFS: " + tempDiff); } } } //end of boolean logic output index (unstripped + stripped) } //end of check 2 //Check 3: UNION based //for each SQL UNION combination to try for (int sqlUnionStringIndex = 0; sqlUnionStringIndex < SQL_UNION_APPENDAGES.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doUnionBased && countUnionBasedRequests < doUnionMaxRequests; sqlUnionStringIndex++) { //new message for each value we attack with HttpMessage msg3 = getNewMsg(); String sqlUnionValue = origParamValue + SQL_UNION_APPENDAGES[sqlUnionStringIndex]; setParameter(msg3, param, sqlUnionValue); //send the message with the modified parameters sendAndReceive(msg3); countUnionBasedRequests++; //now check the results.. look first for UNION specific error messages in the output that were not there in the original output //and failing that, look for generic RDBMS specific error messages //TODO: maybe also try looking at a differentiation based approach?? Prone to false positives though. Iterator<String> errorPatternUnionIterator = SQL_UNION_ERROR_TO_DBMS.keySet().iterator(); while (errorPatternUnionIterator.hasNext() && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { String errorPatternKey = errorPatternUnionIterator.next(); String errorPatternRDBMS = SQL_UNION_ERROR_TO_DBMS.get(errorPatternKey); //Note: must escape the strings, in case they contain strings like "[Microsoft], which would be interpreted as regular character class regexps" Pattern errorPattern = Pattern.compile("\\Q" + errorPatternKey + "\\E", PATTERN_PARAM); //if the "error message" occurs in the result of sending the modified query, but did NOT occur in the original result of the original query //then we may may have a SQL Injection vulnerability StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); String sqlUnionBodyUnstripped = msg3.getResponseBody().toString(); String sqlUnionBodyStripped = this.stripOff(sqlUnionBodyUnstripped, sqlUnionValue); Matcher matcherOrig = errorPattern.matcher(mResBodyNormalStripped); Matcher matcherSQLUnion = errorPattern.matcher(sqlUnionBodyStripped); boolean patternInOrig = matcherOrig.find(); boolean patternInSQLUnion = matcherSQLUnion.find(); //if (! matchBodyPattern(getBaseMsg(), errorPattern, null) && matchBodyPattern(msg3, errorPattern, sb)) { if (!patternInOrig && patternInSQLUnion) { //Likely a UNION Based SQL Injection (by error message). Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.unionbased.extrainfo", errorPatternRDBMS, errorPatternKey); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlUnionValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName() + " - " + errorPatternRDBMS, getDescription(), refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg3); //log it, as the RDBMS may be useful to know later (in subsequent checks, when we need to determine RDBMS specific behaviour, for instance) getKb().add(refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI(), "sql/" + errorPatternRDBMS, Boolean.TRUE); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; continue; } } //end of the loop to check for RDBMS specific UNION error messages } ////for each SQL UNION combination to try //end of check 3 //############################### //check for columns used in the "order by" clause of a SQL statement. earlier tests will likely not catch these //append on " ASC -- " to the end of the original parameter. Grab the results. //if the results are different to the original (unmodified parameter) results, then bale //if the results are the same as for the original parameter value, then the parameter *might* be influencing the order by // try again for "DESC": append on " DESC -- " to the end of the original parameter. Grab the results. // if the results are the same as the original (unmodified parameter) results, then bale // (the results are not under our control, or there is no difference in the ordering, for some reason: 0 or 1 rows only, or ordering // by the first column alone is not sufficient to change the ordering of the data.) // if the results were different to the original (unmodified parameter) results, then // SQL injection!! //Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) //then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original query was last run (could be hours ago) //so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. //Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage); //String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); if (!sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doOrderByBased && countOrderByBasedRequests < doOrderByMaxRequests) { String modifiedParamValue = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + " ASC " + SQL_ONE_LINE_COMMENT; HttpMessage msg5 = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg5, param, modifiedParamValue); sendAndReceive(msg5); countOrderByBasedRequests++; String modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped = msg5.getResponseBody().toString(); String modifiedAscendingOutputStripped = this.stripOff(modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped, modifiedParamValue); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output, and then the stripped output String normalBodyOutput[] = { mResBodyNormalUnstripped, mResBodyNormalStripped }; String ascendingBodyOutput[] = { modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped, modifiedAscendingOutputStripped }; boolean strippedOutput[] = { false, true }; for (int booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex = 0; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex < 2; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex++) { //if the results of the modified request match the original query, we may be onto something. if (ascendingBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Check X, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for modified Order By parameter [" + modifiedParamValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); //confirm that a different parameter value generates different output, to minimise false positives //use the descending order this time String modifiedParamValueConfirm = TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue) + " DESC " + SQL_ONE_LINE_COMMENT; HttpMessage msg5Confirm = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg5Confirm, param, modifiedParamValueConfirm); sendAndReceive(msg5Confirm); countOrderByBasedRequests++; String confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped = msg5Confirm.getResponseBody().toString(); String confirmOrderByOutputStripped = this.stripOff(confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped, modifiedParamValueConfirm); //set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output or the stripped output String confirmOrderByBodyOutput[] = { confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped, confirmOrderByOutputStripped }; if (confirmOrderByBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) != 0) { //the confirm query did not return the same results. This means that arbitrary queries are not all producing the same page output. //this means the fact we earlier reproduced the original page output with a modified parameter was not a coincidence //Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.orderbybased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, ""); else extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanrules.sqlinjection.alert.orderbybased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, "NOT "); //raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = modifiedParamValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, getName(), getDescription(), null, //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg5); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; } } } } //############################### //if a sql injection was found, we should check if the page is flagged as a login page //in any of the contexts. if it is, raise an "SQL Injection - Authentication Bypass" alert in addition to the alerts already raised if (sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { boolean loginUrl = false; //log.debug("### A SQL Injection may lead to auth bypass.."); //are we dealing with a login url in any of the contexts? ExtensionAuth extAuth = (ExtensionAuth) Control.getSingleton().getExtensionLoader() .getExtension(ExtensionAuth.NAME); URI requestUri = getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI(); //using the session, get the list of contexts for the url List<Context> contextList = extAuth.getModel().getSession().getContextsForUrl(requestUri.getURI()); //now loop, and see if the url is a login url in each of the contexts in turn.. for (Context context : contextList) { HttpMessage loginRequest = extAuth.getApi().getLoginRequest(context.getIndex()); if (loginRequest != null) { URI loginUri = loginRequest.getRequestHeader().getURI(); if (requestUri.getScheme().equals(loginUri.getScheme()) && requestUri.getHost().equals(loginUri.getHost()) && requestUri.getPort() == loginUri.getPort() && requestUri.getPath().equals(loginUri.getPath())) { //we got this far.. only the method (GET/POST), user details, query params, fragment, and POST params //are possibly different from the login page. loginUrl = true; //DEBUG only //log.debug("##### The right login page was found"); break; } else { //log.debug("#### This is not the login page you're looking for"); } } else { //log.debug("### This context has no login page set"); } } if (loginUrl) { //log.debug("##### Raising auth bypass"); //raise the alert, using the custom name and description String vulnname = Constant.messages.getString("ascanrules.sqlinjection.authbypass.name"); String vulndesc = Constant.messages.getString("ascanrules.sqlinjection.authbypass.desc"); //raise the alert, using the attack string stored earlier for this purpose bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.WARNING, vulnname, vulndesc, refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), //url param, sqlInjectionAttack, "", getSolution(), getBaseMsg()); } //not a login page } //no sql Injection Found For Url } catch (Exception e) { //Do not try to internationalise this.. we need an error message in any event.. //if it's in English, it's still better than not having it at all. log.error("An error occurred checking a url for SQL Injection vulnerabilities", e); } }