List of usage examples for org.apache.commons.httpclient URI getScheme
public String getScheme()
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrulesBeta.CrossDomainScanner.java
private void scanSilverlightCrossdomainPolicyFile(URI originalURI) throws IOException, XPathExpressionException { // retrieve the Silverlight client access policy file, and assess it. HttpMessage clientaccesspolicymessage = new HttpMessage(new URI(originalURI.getScheme(), originalURI.getAuthority(), "/" + SILVERLIGHT_CROSS_DOMAIN_POLICY_FILE, null, null)); sendAndReceive(clientaccesspolicymessage, false); if (clientaccesspolicymessage.getResponseBody().length() == 0) { return;/*from w w w .j ava2s .c om*/ } byte[] clientaccesspolicymessagebytes = clientaccesspolicymessage.getResponseBody().getBytes(); // parse the file. If it's not parseable, it might have been because of a 404 try { // work around the "no protocol" issue by wrapping the content in a ByteArrayInputStream Document silverlightXmldoc = docBuilder .parse(new InputSource(new ByteArrayInputStream(clientaccesspolicymessagebytes))); XPathExpression exprAllowFromUri = xpath .compile("/access-policy/cross-domain-access/policy/allow-from/domain/@uri"); // gets the uri attributes // check the "allow-from" policies NodeList exprAllowFromUriNodes = (NodeList) exprAllowFromUri.evaluate(silverlightXmldoc, XPathConstants.NODESET); for (int i = 0; i < exprAllowFromUriNodes.getLength(); i++) { String uri = exprAllowFromUriNodes.item(i).getNodeValue(); if (uri.equals("*")) { // tut, tut, tut. if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Bingo! " + SILVERLIGHT_CROSS_DOMAIN_POLICY_FILE + ", at /access-policy/cross-domain-access/policy/allow-from/domain/@uri"); bingo(getRisk(), Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, Constant.messages.getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX_SILVERLIGHT + "name"), Constant.messages.getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX_SILVERLIGHT + "desc"), clientaccesspolicymessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), // the url field "", // parameter being attacked: none. "", // attack Constant.messages.getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX_SILVERLIGHT + "extrainfo"), // extrainfo Constant.messages.getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX_SILVERLIGHT + "soln"), // solution "<domain uri=\"*\"", // evidence clientaccesspolicymessage // the message on which to place the alert ); } } } catch (SAXException | IOException e) { // Could well be a 404 or equivalent log.debug( "An error occurred trying to parse " + SILVERLIGHT_CROSS_DOMAIN_POLICY_FILE + " as XML: " + e); } }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrulesBeta.RemoteCodeExecutionCVE20121823.java
private static URI createAttackUri(URI originalURI, String attackParam) { StringBuilder strBuilder = new StringBuilder(); strBuilder.append(originalURI.getScheme()).append("://").append(originalURI.getEscapedAuthority()); strBuilder.append(originalURI.getRawPath() != null ? originalURI.getEscapedPath() : "/") .append(attackParam);//from w ww . j a v a2s . c o m String uri = strBuilder.toString(); try { return new URI(uri, true); } catch (URIException e) { log.warn("Failed to create attack URI [" + uri + "], cause: " + e.getMessage()); } return null; }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrulesBeta.SessionFixation.java
/** * scans all GET, Cookie params for Session fields, and looks for SessionFixation * vulnerabilities/* w w w . j ava 2 s . c o m*/ */ @Override public void scan() { // TODO: scan the POST (form) params for session id fields. try { boolean loginUrl = false; // Are we dealing with a login url in any of the contexts of which this uri is part URI requestUri = getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI(); ExtensionAuthentication extAuth = (ExtensionAuthentication) Control.getSingleton().getExtensionLoader() .getExtension(ExtensionAuthentication.NAME); // using the session, get the list of contexts for the url List<Context> contextList = extAuth.getModel().getSession().getContextsForUrl(requestUri.getURI()); // now loop, and see if the url is a login url in each of the contexts in turn... for (Context context : contextList) { URI loginUri = extAuth.getLoginRequestURIForContext(context); if (loginUri != null && requestUri.getPath() != null) { if (requestUri.getScheme().equals(loginUri.getScheme()) && requestUri.getHost().equals(loginUri.getHost()) && requestUri.getPort() == loginUri.getPort() && requestUri.getPath().equals(loginUri.getPath())) { // we got this far.. only the method (GET/POST), user details, query params, // fragment, and POST params // are possibly different from the login page. loginUrl = true; break; } } } // For now (from Zap 2.0), the Session Fixation scanner will only run for login pages if (loginUrl == false) { log.debug("For the Session Fixation scanner to actually do anything, a Login Page *must* be set!"); return; } // find all params set in the request (GET/POST/Cookie) // Note: this will be the full set, before we delete anything. TreeSet<HtmlParameter> htmlParams = new TreeSet<>(); htmlParams.addAll(getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getCookieParams()); // request cookies only. no response cookies htmlParams.addAll(getBaseMsg().getFormParams()); // add in the POST params htmlParams.addAll(getBaseMsg().getUrlParams()); // add in the GET params // Now add in the pseudo parameters set in the URL itself, such as in the following: // http://www.example.com/someurl;JSESSIONID=abcdefg?x=123&y=456 // as opposed to the url parameters in the following example, which are already picked // up by getUrlParams() // http://www.example.com/someurl?JSESSIONID=abcdefg&x=123&y=456 // convert from org.apache.commons.httpclient.URI to a String String requestUrl = "Unknown URL"; try { requestUrl = new URL(requestUri.getScheme(), requestUri.getHost(), requestUri.getPort(), requestUri.getPath()).toString(); } catch (Exception e) { // no point in continuing. The URL is invalid. This is a peculiarity in the Zap // core, // and can happen when // - the user browsed to http://www.example.com/bodgeit and // - the user did not browse to http://www.example.com or to http://www.example.com/ // so the Zap GUI displays "http://www.example.com" as a node under "Sites", // and under that, it displays the actual urls to which the user browsed // (http://www.example.com/bodgeit, for instance) // When the user selects the node "http://www.example.com", and tries to scan it // with // the session fixation scanner, the URI that is passed is "http://www.example.com", // which is *not* a valid url. // If the user actually browses to "http://www.example.com" (even without the // trailing slash) // the web browser appends the trailing slash, and so Zap records the URI as // "http://www.example.com/", which IS a valid url, and which can (and should) be // scanned. // // In short.. if this happens, we do not want to scan the URL anyway // (because the user never browsed to it), so just do nothing instead. log.error("Cannot convert URI [" + requestUri + "] to a URL: " + e.getMessage()); return; } // suck out any pseudo url parameters from the url Set<HtmlParameter> pseudoUrlParams = getPseudoUrlParameters(requestUrl); htmlParams.addAll(pseudoUrlParams); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Pseudo url params of URL [" + requestUrl + "] : [" + pseudoUrlParams + "]"); //// for each parameter in turn, // int counter = 0; for (Iterator<HtmlParameter> iter = htmlParams.iterator(); iter.hasNext();) { HttpMessage msg1Final; HttpMessage msg1Initial = getNewMsg(); //// debug logic only.. to do first field only // counter ++; // if ( counter > 1 ) // return; HtmlParameter currentHtmlParameter = iter.next(); // Useful for debugging, but I can't find a way to view this data in the GUI, so // leave it out for now. // msg1Initial.setNote("Message 1 for parameter "+ currentHtmlParameter); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Scanning URL [" + msg1Initial.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] [" + msg1Initial.getRequestHeader().getURI() + "], [" + currentHtmlParameter.getType() + "] field [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] with value [" + currentHtmlParameter.getValue() + "] for Session Fixation"); if (currentHtmlParameter.getType().equals(HtmlParameter.Type.cookie)) { // careful to pick up the cookies from the Request, and not to include cookies // set in any earlier response TreeSet<HtmlParameter> cookieRequestParams = msg1Initial.getRequestHeader().getCookieParams(); // delete the original cookie from the parameters cookieRequestParams.remove(currentHtmlParameter); msg1Initial.setCookieParams(cookieRequestParams); // send the message, minus the cookie parameter, and see how it comes back. // Note: do NOT automatically follow redirects.. handle those here instead. sendAndReceive(msg1Initial, false, false); ///////////////////////////// // create a copy of msg1Initial to play with to handle redirects (if any). // we use a copy because if we change msg1Initial itself, it messes the URL and // params displayed on the GUI. msg1Final = msg1Initial; HtmlParameter cookieBack1 = getResponseCookie(msg1Initial, currentHtmlParameter.getName()); long cookieBack1TimeReceived = System.currentTimeMillis(); // in ms. when was the cookie received? // Important if it has a Max-Age directive Date cookieBack1ExpiryDate = null; HttpMessage temp = msg1Initial; int redirectsFollowed1 = 0; while (HttpStatusCode.isRedirection(temp.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode())) { // Note that we need to clone the Request and the Response.. // we seem to need to track the secure flag now to make sure its set later boolean secure1 = temp.getRequestHeader().isSecure(); temp = temp.cloneAll(); // clone the previous message redirectsFollowed1++; if (redirectsFollowed1 > 10) { throw new Exception("Too many redirects were specified in the first message"); } // create a new URI from the absolute location returned, and interpret it as // escaped // note that the standard says that the Location returned should be // absolute, but it ain't always so... URI newLocation = new URI(temp.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION), true); // and follow the forward url // need to clear the params (which would come from the initial POST, // otherwise) temp.getRequestHeader().setGetParams(new TreeSet<HtmlParameter>()); temp.setRequestBody(""); temp.setResponseBody(""); // make sure no values accidentally carry from one iteration to // the next try { temp.getRequestHeader().setURI(newLocation); } catch (Exception e) { // the Location field contents may not be standards compliant. Lets // generate a uri to use as a workaround where a relative path was // given instead of an absolute one URI newLocationWorkaround = new URI(temp.getRequestHeader().getURI(), temp.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION), true); // try again, except this time, if it fails, don't try to handle it if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The Location [" + newLocation + "] specified in a redirect was not valid. Trying workaround url [" + newLocationWorkaround + "]"); temp.getRequestHeader().setURI(newLocationWorkaround); } temp.getRequestHeader().setSecure(secure1); temp.getRequestHeader().setMethod(HttpRequestHeader.GET); temp.getRequestHeader().setContentLength(0); // since we send a GET, the body will be 0 long if (cookieBack1 != null) { // if the previous request sent back a cookie, we need to set that // cookie when following redirects, as a browser would if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Adding in cookie [" + cookieBack1 + "] for a redirect"); TreeSet<HtmlParameter> forwardCookieParams = temp.getRequestHeader().getCookieParams(); forwardCookieParams.add(cookieBack1); temp.getRequestHeader().setCookieParams(forwardCookieParams); } if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("DEBUG: Cookie Message 1 causes us to follow redirect to [" + newLocation + "]"); sendAndReceive(temp, false, false); // do NOT redirect.. handle it here // handle any cookies set from following redirects that override the cookie // set in the redirect itself (if any) // note that this will handle the case where a latter cookie unsets one set // earlier. HtmlParameter cookieBack1Temp = getResponseCookie(temp, currentHtmlParameter.getName()); if (cookieBack1Temp != null) { cookieBack1 = cookieBack1Temp; cookieBack1TimeReceived = System.currentTimeMillis(); // in ms. record when we got the // cookie.. in case it has a // Max-Age directive } // reset the "final" version of message1 to use the final response in the // chain msg1Final = temp; } /////////////////////////// // if non-200 on the final response for message 1, no point in continuing. Bale // out. if (msg1Final.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() != HttpStatusCode.OK) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug( "Got a non-200 response code [" + msg1Final.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() + "] when sending [" + msg1Initial.getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] with param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] = NULL (possibly somewhere in the redirects)"); continue; } // now check that the response set a cookie. if it didn't, then either.. // 1) we are messing with the wrong field // 2) the app doesn't do sessions // either way, there is not much point in continuing to look at this field.. if (cookieBack1 == null || cookieBack1.getValue() == null) { // no cookie was set, or the cookie param was set to a null value if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The Cookie parameter was NOT set in the response, when cookie param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] was set to NULL: " + cookieBack1); continue; } ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // at this point, before continuing to check for Session Fixation, do some other // checks on the session cookie we got back // that might cause us to raise additional alerts (in addition to doing the main // check for Session Fixation) ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Check 1: was the session cookie sent and received securely by the server? // If not, alert this fact if ((!msg1Final.getRequestHeader().isSecure()) || (!cookieBack1.getFlags().contains("secure"))) { // pass the original param value here, not the new value, since we're // displaying the session id exposed in the original message String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sessionidsentinsecurely.alert.extrainfo", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), currentHtmlParameter.getValue()); if (!cookieBack1.getFlags().contains("secure")) { extraInfo += ("\n" + Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sessionidsentinsecurely.alert.extrainfo.secureflagnotset")); } // and figure out the risk, depending on whether it is a login page int risk = Alert.RISK_LOW; if (loginUrl) { extraInfo += ("\n" + Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionidsentinsecurely.alert.extrainfo.loginpage")); // login page, so higher risk risk = Alert.RISK_MEDIUM; } else { // not a login page.. lower risk risk = Alert.RISK_LOW; } String attack = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sessionidsentinsecurely.alert.attack", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); String vulnname = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidsentinsecurely.name"); String vulndesc = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidsentinsecurely.desc"); String vulnsoln = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidsentinsecurely.soln"); // call bingo with some extra info, indicating that the alert is // not specific to Session Fixation, but has its own title and description // (etc) // the alert here is "Session id sent insecurely", or words to that effect. bingo(risk, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, vulnname, vulndesc, getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), attack, extraInfo, vulnsoln, getBaseMsg()); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { String logMessage = MessageFormat.format( "A session identifier in {2} field: [{3}] may be sent " + "via an insecure mechanism at [{0}] URL [{1}]", getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getMethod(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); log.debug(logMessage); } // Note: do NOT continue to the next field at this point.. // since we still need to check for Session Fixation. } ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Check 2: is the session cookie that was set accessible to Javascript? // If so, alert this fact too if (!cookieBack1.getFlags().contains("httponly") && loginUrl) { // pass the original param value here, not the new value, since we're // displaying the session id exposed in the original message String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sessionidaccessiblebyjavascript.alert.extrainfo", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), currentHtmlParameter.getValue()); String attack = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sessionidaccessiblebyjavascript.alert.attack", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); String vulnname = Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionidaccessiblebyjavascript.name"); String vulndesc = Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionidaccessiblebyjavascript.desc"); String vulnsoln = Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionidaccessiblebyjavascript.soln"); extraInfo += ("\n" + Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionidaccessiblebyjavascript.alert.extrainfo.loginpage")); // call bingo with some extra info, indicating that the alert is // not specific to Session Fixation, but has its own title and description // (etc) // the alert here is "Session id accessible in Javascript", or words to that // effect. bingo(Alert.RISK_LOW, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, vulnname, vulndesc, getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), attack, extraInfo, vulnsoln, getBaseMsg()); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { String logMessage = MessageFormat.format( "A session identifier in [{0}] URL [{1}] {2} field: " + "[{3}] may be accessible to JavaScript", getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getMethod(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); log.debug(logMessage); } // Note: do NOT continue to the next field at this point.. // since we still need to check for Session Fixation. } ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Check 3: is the session cookie set to expire soon? when the browser session // closes? never? // the longer the session cookie is valid, the greater the risk. alert it // accordingly String cookieBack1Expiry = null; int sessionExpiryRiskLevel; String sessionExpiryDescription = null; // check for the Expires header for (Iterator<String> i = cookieBack1.getFlags().iterator(); i.hasNext();) { String cookieBack1Flag = i.next(); // if ( this.debugEnabled ) log.debug("Cookie back 1 flag (checking for // Expires): "+ cookieBack1Flag); // match in a case insensitive manner. never know what case various web // servers are going to send back. // if (cookieBack1Flag.matches("(?i)expires=.*")) { if (cookieBack1Flag.toLowerCase(Locale.ENGLISH).startsWith("expires=")) { String[] cookieBack1FlagValues = cookieBack1Flag.split("="); if (cookieBack1FlagValues.length > 1) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Cookie Expiry: " + cookieBack1FlagValues[1]); cookieBack1Expiry = cookieBack1FlagValues[1]; // the Date String sessionExpiryDescription = cookieBack1FlagValues[1]; // the Date String cookieBack1ExpiryDate = DateUtil.parseDate(cookieBack1Expiry); // the actual Date } } } // also check for the Max-Age header, which overrides the Expires header. // WARNING: this Directive is reported to be ignored by IE, so if both Expires // and Max-Age are present // and we report based on the Max-Age value, but the user is using IE, then the // results reported // by us here may be different from those actually experienced by the user! (we // use Max-Age, IE uses Expires) for (Iterator<String> i = cookieBack1.getFlags().iterator(); i.hasNext();) { String cookieBack1Flag = i.next(); // if ( this.debugEnabled ) log.debug("Cookie back 1 flag (checking for // Max-Age): "+ cookieBack1Flag); // match in a case insensitive manner. never know what case various web // servers are going to send back. if (cookieBack1Flag.toLowerCase(Locale.ENGLISH).startsWith("max-age=")) { String[] cookieBack1FlagValues = cookieBack1Flag.split("="); if (cookieBack1FlagValues.length > 1) { // now the Max-Age value is the number of seconds relative to the // time the browser received the cookie // (as stored in cookieBack1TimeReceived) if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Cookie Max Age: " + cookieBack1FlagValues[1]); long cookie1DropDeadMS = cookieBack1TimeReceived + (Long.parseLong(cookieBack1FlagValues[1]) * 1000); cookieBack1ExpiryDate = new Date(cookie1DropDeadMS); // the actual Date the cookie // expires (by Max-Age) cookieBack1Expiry = DateUtil.formatDate(cookieBack1ExpiryDate, DateUtil.PATTERN_RFC1123); sessionExpiryDescription = cookieBack1Expiry; // needs to the Date String } } } String sessionExpiryRiskDescription = null; // check the Expiry/Max-Age details garnered (if any) // and figure out the risk, depending on whether it is a login page // and how long the session will live before expiring if (cookieBack1ExpiryDate == null) { // session expires when the browser closes.. rate this as medium risk? sessionExpiryRiskLevel = Alert.RISK_MEDIUM; sessionExpiryRiskDescription = "ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.browserclose"; sessionExpiryDescription = Constant.messages.getString(sessionExpiryRiskDescription); } else { long datediffSeconds = (cookieBack1ExpiryDate.getTime() - cookieBack1TimeReceived) / 1000; long anHourSeconds = 3600; long aDaySeconds = anHourSeconds * 24; long aWeekSeconds = aDaySeconds * 7; if (datediffSeconds < 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The session cookie has expired already"); sessionExpiryRiskDescription = "ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.timeexpired"; sessionExpiryRiskLevel = Alert.RISK_INFO; // no risk.. the cookie has expired already } else if (datediffSeconds > aWeekSeconds) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The session cookie is set to last for more than a week!"); sessionExpiryRiskDescription = "ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.timemorethanoneweek"; sessionExpiryRiskLevel = Alert.RISK_HIGH; } else if (datediffSeconds > aDaySeconds) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The session cookie is set to last for more than a day"); sessionExpiryRiskDescription = "ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.timemorethanoneday"; sessionExpiryRiskLevel = Alert.RISK_MEDIUM; } else if (datediffSeconds > anHourSeconds) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The session cookie is set to last for more than an hour"); sessionExpiryRiskDescription = "ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.timemorethanonehour"; sessionExpiryRiskLevel = Alert.RISK_LOW; } else { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The session cookie is set to last for less than an hour!"); sessionExpiryRiskDescription = "ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.timelessthanonehour"; sessionExpiryRiskLevel = Alert.RISK_INFO; } } if (!loginUrl) { // decrement the risk if it's not a login page sessionExpiryRiskLevel--; } // alert it if the default session expiry risk level is more than informational if (sessionExpiryRiskLevel > Alert.RISK_INFO) { // pass the original param value here, not the new value String cookieReceivedTime = cookieBack1Expiry = DateUtil .formatDate(new Date(cookieBack1TimeReceived), DateUtil.PATTERN_RFC1123); String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.alert.extrainfo", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), currentHtmlParameter.getValue(), sessionExpiryDescription, cookieReceivedTime); String attack = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.alert.attack", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); String vulnname = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.name"); String vulndesc = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.desc"); String vulnsoln = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.soln"); if (loginUrl) { extraInfo += ("\n" + Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexpiry.alert.extrainfo.loginpage")); } // call bingo with some extra info, indicating that the alert is // not specific to Session Fixation, but has its own title and description // (etc) // the alert here is "Session Id Expiry Time is excessive", or words to that // effect. bingo(sessionExpiryRiskLevel, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, vulnname, vulndesc, getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), attack, extraInfo, vulnsoln, getBaseMsg()); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { String logMessage = MessageFormat.format( "A session identifier in [{0}] URL [{1}] {2} field: " + "[{3}] may be accessed until [{4}], unless the session is destroyed.", getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getMethod(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), sessionExpiryDescription); log.debug(logMessage); } // Note: do NOT continue to the next field at this point.. // since we still need to check for Session Fixation. } if (!loginUrl) { // not a login page.. skip continue; } //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /// Message 2 - processing starts here //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // so now that we know the URL responds with 200 (OK), and that it sets a // cookie, lets re-issue the original request, // but lets add in the new (valid) session cookie that was just issued. // we will re-send it. the aim is then to see if it accepts the cookie (BAD, in // some circumstances), // or if it issues a new session cookie (GOOD, in most circumstances) if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("A Cookie was set by the URL for the correct param, when param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] was set to NULL: " + cookieBack1); // use a copy of msg2Initial, since it has already had the correct cookie // removed in the request.. // do NOT use msg2Initial itself, as this will cause both requests in the GUI to // show the modified data.. // finally send the second message, and see how it comes back. HttpMessage msg2Initial = msg1Initial.cloneRequest(); TreeSet<HtmlParameter> cookieParams2Set = msg2Initial.getRequestHeader().getCookieParams(); cookieParams2Set.add(cookieBack1); msg2Initial.setCookieParams(cookieParams2Set); // resend the copy of the initial message, but with the valid session cookie // added in, to see if it is accepted // do not automatically follow redirects, as we need to check these for cookies // being set. sendAndReceive(msg2Initial, false, false); // create a copy of msg2Initial to play with to handle redirects (if any). // we use a copy because if we change msg2Initial itself, it messes the URL and // params displayed on the GUI. HttpMessage temp2 = msg2Initial; HttpMessage msg2Final = msg2Initial; HtmlParameter cookieBack2Previous = cookieBack1; HtmlParameter cookieBack2 = getResponseCookie(msg2Initial, currentHtmlParameter.getName()); int redirectsFollowed2 = 0; while (HttpStatusCode.isRedirection(temp2.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode())) { // clone the previous message boolean secure2 = temp2.getRequestHeader().isSecure(); temp2 = temp2.cloneAll(); redirectsFollowed2++; if (redirectsFollowed2 > 10) { throw new Exception("Too many redirects were specified in the second message"); } // create a new URI from the absolute location returned, and interpret it as // escaped // note that the standard says that the Location returned should be // absolute, but it ain't always so... URI newLocation = new URI(temp2.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION), true); // and follow the forward url // need to clear the params (which would come from the initial POST, // otherwise) temp2.getRequestHeader().setGetParams(new TreeSet<HtmlParameter>()); temp2.setRequestBody(""); temp2.setResponseBody(""); // make sure no values accidentally carry from one iteration to // the next try { temp2.getRequestHeader().setURI(newLocation); } catch (Exception e) { // the Location field contents may not be standards compliant. Lets // generate a uri to use as a workaround where a relative path was // given instead of an absolute one URI newLocationWorkaround = new URI(temp2.getRequestHeader().getURI(), temp2.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION), true); // try again, except this time, if it fails, don't try to handle it if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The Location [" + newLocation + "] specified in a redirect was not valid. Trying workaround url [" + newLocationWorkaround + "]"); temp2.getRequestHeader().setURI(newLocationWorkaround); } temp2.getRequestHeader().setSecure(secure2); temp2.getRequestHeader().setMethod(HttpRequestHeader.GET); temp2.getRequestHeader().setContentLength(0); // since we send a GET, the body will be 0 long if (cookieBack2 != null) { // if the previous request sent back a cookie, we need to set that // cookie when following redirects, as a browser would // also make sure to delete the previous value set for the cookie value if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Deleting old cookie [" + cookieBack2Previous + "], and adding in cookie [" + cookieBack2 + "] for a redirect"); } TreeSet<HtmlParameter> forwardCookieParams = temp2.getRequestHeader().getCookieParams(); forwardCookieParams.remove(cookieBack2Previous); forwardCookieParams.add(cookieBack2); temp2.getRequestHeader().setCookieParams(forwardCookieParams); } sendAndReceive(temp2, false, false); // do NOT automatically redirect.. handle redirects here // handle any cookies set from following redirects that override the cookie // set in the redirect itself (if any) // note that this will handle the case where a latter cookie unsets one set // earlier. HtmlParameter cookieBack2Temp = getResponseCookie(temp2, currentHtmlParameter.getName()); if (cookieBack2Temp != null) { cookieBack2Previous = cookieBack2; cookieBack2 = cookieBack2Temp; } // reset the "final" version of message2 to use the final response in the // chain msg2Final = temp2; } if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Done following redirects"); // final result was non-200, no point in continuing. Bale out. if (msg2Final.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() != HttpStatusCode.OK) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug( "Got a non-200 response code [" + msg2Final.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() + "] when sending [" + msg2Initial.getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] with a borrowed cookie (or by following a redirect) for param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "]"); continue; // to next parameter } // and what we've been waiting for.. do we get a *different* cookie being set in // the response of message 2?? // or do we get a new cookie back at all? // No cookie back => the borrowed cookie was accepted. Not ideal // Cookie back, but same as the one we sent in => the borrowed cookie was // accepted. Not ideal if ((cookieBack2 == null) || cookieBack2.getValue().equals(cookieBack1.getValue())) { // no cookie back, when a borrowed cookie is in use.. suspicious! // use the cookie extrainfo message, which is specific to the case of // cookies // pretty much everything else is generic to all types of Session Fixation // vulnerabilities String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sessionfixation.alert.cookie.extrainfo", currentHtmlParameter.getName(), cookieBack1.getValue(), (cookieBack2 == null ? "NULL" : cookieBack2.getValue())); String attack = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionfixation.alert.attack", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); if (loginUrl) { extraInfo += ("\n" + Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionfixation.alert.cookie.extrainfo.loginpage")); } bingo(Alert.RISK_INFO, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, msg2Initial.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), attack, extraInfo, msg2Initial); logSessionFixation(msg2Initial, currentHtmlParameter.getType().toString(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); } continue; // jump to the next iteration of the loop (ie, the next parameter) } // end of the cookie code. // start of the url parameter code // note that this actually caters for // - actual URL parameters // - pseudo URL parameters, where the sessionid was in the path portion of the URL, // in conjunction with URL re-writing if (currentHtmlParameter.getType().equals(HtmlParameter.Type.url)) { boolean isPseudoUrlParameter = false; // is this "url parameter" actually a url parameter, or was it // path of the path (+url re-writing)? String possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam = null; // remove the named url parameter from the request.. TreeSet<HtmlParameter> urlRequestParams = msg1Initial.getUrlParams(); // get parameters? if (!urlRequestParams.remove(currentHtmlParameter)) { isPseudoUrlParameter = true; // was not removed because it was a pseudo Url parameter, not a real url // parameter.. (so it would not be in the url params) // in this case, we will need to "rewrite" (ie hack) the URL path to remove // the pseudo url parameter portion // ie, we need to remove the ";jsessionid=<sessionid>" bit from the path // (assuming the current field is named 'jsessionid') // and replace it with ";jsessionid=" (ie, we nullify the possible "session" // parameter in the hope that a new session will be issued) // then we continue as usual to see if the URL is vulnerable to a Session // Fixation issue // Side note: quote the string to search for, and the replacement, so that // regex special characters are treated as literals String hackedUrl = requestUrl.replaceAll( Pattern.quote(";" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "=" + currentHtmlParameter.getValue()), Matcher.quoteReplacement(";" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "=")); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Removing the pseudo URL parameter from [" + requestUrl + "]: [" + hackedUrl + "]"); // Note: the URL is not escaped. Handle it. msg1Initial.getRequestHeader().setURI(new URI(hackedUrl, false)); } msg1Initial.setGetParams(urlRequestParams); // url parameters // send the message, minus the value for the current parameter, and see how it // comes back. // Note: automatically follow redirects.. no need to look at any intermediate // responses. // this was only necessary for cookie-based session implementations sendAndReceive(msg1Initial); // if non-200 on the response for message 1, no point in continuing. Bale out. if (msg1Initial.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() != HttpStatusCode.OK) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Got a non-200 response code [" + msg1Initial.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() + "] when sending [" + msg1Initial.getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] with param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] = NULL (possibly somewhere in the redirects)"); continue; } // now parse the HTML response for urls that contain the same parameter name, // and look at the values for that parameter // if no values are found for the parameter, then // 1) we are messing with the wrong field, or // 2) the app doesn't do sessions // either way, there is not much point in continuing to look at this field.. // parse out links in HTML (assume for a moment that all the URLs are in links) // this gives us a map of parameter value for the current parameter, to the // number of times it was encountered in links in the HTML SortedMap<String, Integer> parametersInHTMLURls = getParameterValueCountInHtml( msg1Initial.getResponseBody().toString(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), isPseudoUrlParameter); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The count of the various values of the [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] parameters in urls in the result of retrieving the url with a null value for parameter [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "]: " + parametersInHTMLURls); if (parametersInHTMLURls.isEmpty()) { // setting the param to NULL did not cause any new values to be generated // for it in the output.. // so either.. // it is not a session field, or // it is a session field, but a session is only issued on authentication, // and this is not an authentication url // the app doesn't do sessions (etc) // either way, the parameter/url combo is not vulnerable, so continue with // the next parameter if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The URL parameter [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] was NOT set in any links in the response, when " + (isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo/URL rewritten" : "") + " URL param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] was set to NULL in the request, so it is likely not a session id field"); continue; // to the next parameter } else if (parametersInHTMLURls.size() == 1) { // the parameter was set to just one value in the output // so it's quite possible it is the session id field that we have been // looking for // caveat 1: check it is longer than 3 chars long, to remove false // positives.. // we assume here that a real session id will always be greater than 3 // characters long // caveat 2: the value we got back for the param must be different from the // value we // over-wrote with NULL (empty) in the first place, otherwise it is very // unlikely to // be a session id field possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam = parametersInHTMLURls.firstKey(); // did we get back the same value we just nulled out in the original // request? // if so, use this to eliminate false positives, and to optimise. if (possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam.equals(currentHtmlParameter.getValue())) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug((isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo/URL rewritten" : "") + " URL param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "], when set to NULL, causes 1 distinct values to be set for it in URLs in the output, but the possible session id value [" + possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam + "] is the same as the value we over-wrote with NULL. 'Sorry, kid. You got the gift, but it looks like you're waiting for something'"); continue; // to the next parameter } if (possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam.length() > 3) { // raise an alert here on an exposed session id, even if it is not // subject to a session fixation vulnerability // log.info("The URL parameter ["+ currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] // was set ["+ // parametersInHTMLURls.get(possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam)+ "] // times to ["+ possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam + "] in links in the // response, when "+ (isPseudoUrlParameter?"pseudo/URL rewritten":"")+ " // URL param ["+ currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] was set to NULL in // the request. This likely indicates it is a session id field."); // pass the original param value here, not the new value, since we're // displaying the session id exposed in the original message String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sessionidexposedinurl.alert.extrainfo", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), currentHtmlParameter.getValue()); String attack = Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexposedinurl.alert.attack", (isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo/URL rewritten " : "") + currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); String vulnname = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexposedinurl.name"); String vulndesc = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexposedinurl.desc"); String vulnsoln = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexposedinurl.soln"); if (loginUrl) { extraInfo += ("\n" + Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionidexposedinurl.alert.extrainfo.loginpage")); } // call bingo with some extra info, indicating that the alert is // not specific to Session Fixation, but has its own title and // description (etc) // the alert here is "Session id exposed in url", or words to that // effect. bingo(Alert.RISK_MEDIUM, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, vulnname, vulndesc, getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), attack, extraInfo, vulnsoln, getBaseMsg()); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { String logMessage = MessageFormat.format( "An exposed session identifier has been found at " + "[{0}] URL [{1}] on {2} field: [{3}]", getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getMethod(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), (isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo " : "") + currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); log.debug(logMessage); } // Note: do NOT continue to the next field at this point.. // since we still need to check for Session Fixation. } else { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug((isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo/URL rewritten" : "") + " URL param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "], when set to NULL, causes 1 distinct values to be set for it in URLs in the output, but the possible session id value [" + possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam + "] is too short to be a real session id."); continue; // to the next parameter } } else { // strange scenario: setting the param to null causes multiple different // values to be set for it in the output // it could still be a session parameter, but we assume it is *not* a // session id field // log it, but assume it is not a session id if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug((isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo/URL rewritten" : "") + " URL param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "], when set to NULL, causes [" + parametersInHTMLURls.size() + "] distinct values to be set for it in URLs in the output. Assuming it is NOT a session id as a consequence. This could be a false negative"); continue; // to the next parameter } //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /// Message 2 - processing starts here //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // we now have a plausible session id field to play with, so set it to a // borrowed value. // ie: lets re-send the request, but add in the new (valid) session value that // was just issued. // the aim is then to see if it accepts the session without re-issuing the // session id (BAD, in some circumstances), // or if it issues a new session value (GOOD, in most circumstances) // and set the (modified) session for the second message // use a copy of msg2Initial, since it has already had the correct session // removed in the request.. // do NOT use msg2Initial itself, as this will cause both requests in the GUI to // show the modified data.. // finally send the second message, and see how it comes back. HttpMessage msg2Initial = msg1Initial.cloneRequest(); // set the parameter to the new session id value (in different manners, // depending on whether it is a real url param, or a pseudo url param) if (isPseudoUrlParameter) { // we need to "rewrite" (hack) the URL path to remove the pseudo url // parameter portion // id, we need to remove the ";jsessionid=<sessionid>" bit from the path // and replace it with ";jsessionid=" (ie, we nullify the possible "session" // parameter in the hope that a new session will be issued) // then we continue as usual to see if the URL is vulnerable to a Session // Fixation issue // Side note: quote the string to search for, and the replacement, so that // regex special characters are treated as literals String hackedUrl = requestUrl.replaceAll( Pattern.quote(";" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "=" + currentHtmlParameter.getValue()), Matcher.quoteReplacement(";" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "=" + possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam)); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Changing the pseudo URL parameter from [" + requestUrl + "]: [" + hackedUrl + "]"); // Note: the URL is not escaped msg2Initial.getRequestHeader().setURI(new URI(hackedUrl, false)); msg2Initial.setGetParams(msg1Initial.getUrlParams()); // restore the GET params } else { // do it via the normal url parameters TreeSet<HtmlParameter> urlRequestParams2 = msg2Initial.getUrlParams(); urlRequestParams2.add(new HtmlParameter(Type.url, currentHtmlParameter.getName(), possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam)); msg2Initial.setGetParams(urlRequestParams2); // restore the GET params } // resend a copy of the initial message, but with the new valid session // parameter added in, to see if it is accepted // automatically follow redirects, which are irrelevant for the purposes of // testing URL parameters sendAndReceive(msg2Initial); // final result was non-200, no point in continuing. Bale out. if (msg2Initial.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() != HttpStatusCode.OK) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Got a non-200 response code [" + msg2Initial.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() + "] when sending [" + msg2Initial.getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] with a borrowed session (or by following a redirect) for param [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "]"); continue; // next field! } // do the analysis on the parameters in link urls in the HTML output again to // see if the session id was regenerated SortedMap<String, Integer> parametersInHTMLURls2 = getParameterValueCountInHtml( msg2Initial.getResponseBody().toString(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), isPseudoUrlParameter); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The count of the various values of the [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] parameters in urls in the result of retrieving the url with a borrowed session value for parameter [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "]: " + parametersInHTMLURls2); if (parametersInHTMLURls2.size() != 1) { // either no values, or multiple values, but not 1 value. For a session // that was regenerated, we would have expected to see // just 1 new value if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The HTML has spoken. [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] doesn't look like a session id field, because there are " + parametersInHTMLURls2.size() + " distinct values for this parameter in urls in the HTML output"); continue; } // there is but one value for this param in links in the HTML output. But is it // vulnerable to Session Fixation? Ie, is it the same parameter? String possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam2 = parametersInHTMLURls2.firstKey(); if (possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam2.equals(possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam)) { // same sessionid used in the output.. so it is likely that we have a // SessionFixation issue.. // use the url param extrainfo message, which is specific to the case of url // parameters and url re-writing Session Fixation issue // pretty much everything else is generic to all types of Session Fixation // vulnerabilities String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sessionfixation.alert.url.extrainfo", currentHtmlParameter.getName(), possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam, possibleSessionIdIssuedForUrlParam2); String attack = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sessionfixation.alert.attack", (isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo/URL rewritten " : "") + currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); int risk = Alert.RISK_LOW; if (loginUrl) { extraInfo += ("\n" + Constant.messages .getString("ascanbeta.sessionfixation.alert.url.extrainfo.loginpage")); // login page, so higher risk risk = Alert.RISK_MEDIUM; } else { // not a login page.. lower risk risk = Alert.RISK_LOW; } bingo(risk, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), attack, extraInfo, getBaseMsg()); logSessionFixation(getBaseMsg(), (isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo " : "") + currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); continue; // jump to the next iteration of the loop (ie, the next parameter) } else { // different sessionid used in the output.. so it is unlikely that we have a // SessionFixation issue.. // more likely that the Session is being re-issued for every single request, // or we have issues a login request, which // normally causes a session to be reissued if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The " + (isPseudoUrlParameter ? "pseudo/URL rewritten" : "") + " parameter [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] in url [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] changes with requests, and so it likely not vulnerable to Session Fixation"); } continue; // onto the next parameter } // end of the url parameter code. } // end of the for loop around the parameter list } catch (Exception e) { // Do not try to internationalise this.. we need an error message in any event.. // if it's in English, it's still better than not having it at all. log.error("An error occurred checking a url for Session Fixation issues", e); } }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrulesBeta.SourceCodeDisclosureSVN.java
/** * finds the source code for the given file, using SVN metadata on the server (if this is * available)//from ww w . j a v a 2 s . com * * @param uri the URI of a file, whose source code we want to find * @return Did we find the source code? */ private boolean findSourceCodeSVN(HttpMessage originalMessage) throws Exception { AlertThreshold alertThreshold = getAlertThreshold(); // SVN formats 1-10 (format 11 is not used) are supported by this logic. // TODO: The SQLite based (and centralised, except for pre-release formats which we don't // plan to support) ".svn/wc.db" style used from SVN format 12 through to 31 // (and possibly later formats) is not yet supported here. It's a work in progress. // It is fully supported in the Spider, however. URI uri = originalMessage.getRequestHeader().getURI(); String path = uri.getPath(); if (path == null) path = ""; // String filename = path.substring( path.lastIndexOf('/')+1, path.length() ); String urlfilename = uri.getName(); String fileExtension = null; if (urlfilename.contains(".")) { fileExtension = urlfilename.substring(urlfilename.lastIndexOf(".") + 1); fileExtension = fileExtension.toUpperCase(); } // do not recurse into a Subversion folder... this would cause infinite recursion issues in // Attack Mode. (which goes depth first!) // in any event, it doesn't make sense to do this. if (path.contains("/.svn/") || path.endsWith("/.svn")) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug( "Nope. It doesn't make any sense to look for a Subversion repo *within* a Subversion repo"); return false; } // Look for SVN < 1.7 metadata (ie internal SVN format < 29) containing source code // These versions all store the pristine copies in the the same format (insofar as the logic // here is concerned, at least) try { String pathminusfilename = path.substring(0, path.lastIndexOf(urlfilename)); HttpMessage svnsourcefileattackmsg = new HttpMessage(new URI(uri.getScheme(), uri.getAuthority(), pathminusfilename + ".svn/text-base/" + urlfilename + ".svn-base", null, null)); svnsourcefileattackmsg.setCookieParams(this.getBaseMsg().getCookieParams()); // svnsourcefileattackmsg.setRequestHeader(this.getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader()); sendAndReceive(svnsourcefileattackmsg, false); // do not follow redirects int attackmsgResponseStatusCode = svnsourcefileattackmsg.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode(); if (shouldStop(alertThreshold, attackmsgResponseStatusCode)) { return false; } if (originalMessage.getResponseBody().toString() .equals(svnsourcefileattackmsg.getResponseBody().toString())) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("Response bodies are exactly the same, so can not be the source code"); } } else if (!UNWANTED_RESPONSE_CODES.contains(attackmsgResponseStatusCode)) { // If the response is wanted (not on the // unwanted list) String attackFilename = uri.getScheme() + "://" + uri.getAuthority() + pathminusfilename + ".svn/text-base/" + urlfilename + ".svn-base"; if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("The contents for request '" + attackFilename + "' do not return 404 or 3**, so we possibly have the source code using SVN < 1.7"); } // check the contents of the output to some degree, if we have a file extension. // if not, just try it (could be a false positive, but hey) String evidence = findEvidenceForExtension(svnsourcefileattackmsg.getResponseBody().getBytes(), fileExtension); if (evidence != null) { // if we get to here, is is very likely that we have source file inclusion // attack. alert it. bingo(Alert.RISK_MEDIUM, getConfidence(attackmsgResponseStatusCode), getName(), getDescription(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), null, attackFilename, getExtraInfo(urlfilename, attackFilename), getSolution(), evidence, svnsourcefileattackmsg); // if we found one, do not even try the "super" method, which tries each of the // parameters, // since this is slow, and we already found an instance return true; } else { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("The HTML output does not look like source code of type " + fileExtension); } } else { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("Got an unsuitable response code " + svnsourcefileattackmsg.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() + ", so it looks like SVN < 1.7 source code file was not found"); } } } catch (Exception e) { log.warn("Got an error trying to find source code using the format used by SVN < 1.7", e); } // try again, by assuming that SVN 1.7 or later is used. These versions use a different // internal format, and store the source code in different locations compared to SVN < 1.7. // Note that it's not as simple this time around, because the name of the file that contains // the source code is based on a SHA1 hash of the file contents, rather than being based on // the source file name. // In other words, we can't guess the name of the internal SVN file, and we can't just // calculate it from the file name. The good news is that the file name that we need is // contained in the centralised // "wc.db" SVN metadata file that is associated with SVN >= 1.7. // "wc.db" lives in ".svn/wc.db". This file contains data for all of the files in the repo // (ie, it contains data for the root directory and all subdirectories of the repo). // The only real issue we have is the question of where within the web folder structure (or // mappings) that the "wc.db" file resides. // For instance, the ".svn" directory might have been deployed into // "http://www.example.com/.svn", // or it *might* have been deployed into "http://www.example.com/dir1/dir2/.svn". // If we're looking for the SVN >= 1.7 source for // "http://www.example.com/dir1/dir2/login.php", for instance, we need to check for the // "wc.db" file in the following locations: // "http://www.example.com/dir1/dir2/.svn/wc.db" // "http://www.example.com/dir1/.svn/wc.db" // "http://www.example.com/.svn/wc.db" // ie, we need to traverse all the way back to the web root looking for it. // Once we've found the "wc.db" file, we use it as an index, looking up the name of the file // for which we're trying to get the source code. // That gives us the internal SVN file name (containing the SHA1 value), which we can (in // theory) then retrieve. If it works, we will retrieve the source code for the file! try { String pathminusfilename = path.substring(0, path.lastIndexOf(urlfilename)); while (!pathminusfilename.equals("/")) { HttpMessage svnWCDBAttackMsg = new HttpMessage( new URI(uri.getScheme(), uri.getAuthority(), pathminusfilename + ".svn/wc.db", null, null)); svnWCDBAttackMsg.setCookieParams(this.getBaseMsg().getCookieParams()); // svnsourcefileattackmsg.setRequestHeader(this.getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader()); sendAndReceive(svnWCDBAttackMsg, false); // do not follow redirects int svnWCDBAttackMsgStatusCode = svnWCDBAttackMsg.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode(); if (shouldStop(alertThreshold, svnWCDBAttackMsgStatusCode)) { return false; } if (originalMessage.getResponseBody().toString() .equals(svnWCDBAttackMsg.getResponseBody().toString())) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("Response bodies are exactly the same, so can not be the source code"); } } else if (!UNWANTED_RESPONSE_CODES.contains(svnWCDBAttackMsgStatusCode)) { // If the response is wanted (not on the // unwanted list) // calculate the path used to access the wc.db, as well as the matching relpath // to query the wc.db // since the relpath is calculated from the original message URL path, after // removing the base used in the wc.db url path String wcdbAttackFilename = uri.getScheme() + "://" + uri.getAuthority() + pathminusfilename + ".svn/wc.db"; String relPath = path.substring(path.indexOf(pathminusfilename) + pathminusfilename.length()); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("The contents for request '" + wcdbAttackFilename + "' do not return 404 or 3**, so we found the '.svn/wc.db' file for SVN >= 1.7.."); log.debug("The relpath to query SQLite is '" + relPath + "'"); } // so we found the wc.db file... handle it. // get the binary data, and put it in a temp file we can use with the SQLite // JDBC driver // Note: File is not AutoClosable, so cannot use a "try with resources" to // manage it File tempSqliteFile; tempSqliteFile = File.createTempFile("sqlite_svn_wc_db", null); tempSqliteFile.deleteOnExit(); OutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(tempSqliteFile); fos.write(svnWCDBAttackMsg.getResponseBody().getBytes()); fos.close(); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { org.sqlite.JDBC jdbcDriver = new org.sqlite.JDBC(); log.debug("Created a temporary SQLite database file '" + tempSqliteFile + "'"); log.debug("SQLite JDBC Driver is version " + jdbcDriver.getMajorVersion() + "." + jdbcDriver.getMinorVersion()); } // now load the temporary SQLite file using JDBC, and query the file entries // within. Class.forName("org.sqlite.JDBC"); String sqliteConnectionUrl = "jdbc:sqlite:" + tempSqliteFile.getAbsolutePath(); try (Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(sqliteConnectionUrl)) { if (conn != null) { Statement pragmaStatement = null; PreparedStatement nodeStatement = null; ResultSet rsSVNWCFormat = null; ResultSet rsNode = null; ResultSet rsRepo = null; try { pragmaStatement = conn.createStatement(); rsSVNWCFormat = pragmaStatement.executeQuery("pragma USER_VERSION"); // get the precise internal version of SVN in use // this will inform how the scanner should proceed in an efficient // manner. int svnFormat = 0; while (rsSVNWCFormat.next()) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Got a row from 'pragma USER_VERSION'"); svnFormat = rsSVNWCFormat.getInt(1); break; } if (svnFormat < 29) { throw new Exception( "The SVN Working Copy Format of the SQLite database should be >= 29. We found " + svnFormat); } if (svnFormat > 31) { throw new Exception("SVN Working Copy Format " + svnFormat + " is not supported at this time. We support up to and including format 31 (~ SVN 1.8.5)"); } if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("Internal SVN Working Copy Format for " + tempSqliteFile + " is " + svnFormat); log.debug( "Refer to http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/subversion/trunk/subversion/libsvn_wc/wc.h for more details!"); } // allow future changes to be easily handled switch (svnFormat) { case 29: case 30: case 31: nodeStatement = conn.prepareStatement( "select kind,local_relpath,'pristine/'||substr(checksum,7,2) || \"/\" || substr(checksum,7)|| \".svn-base\" from nodes where local_relpath = ? order by wc_id"); break; } // now set the parameter, and execute the query nodeStatement.setString(1, relPath); rsNode = nodeStatement.executeQuery(); // and get the internal name of the SVN file stored in the SVN repo while (rsNode.next()) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Got a Node from the SVN wc.db file (format " + svnFormat + ")"); // String kind = rsNode.getString(1); // String filename = rsNode.getString(2); String svnFilename = rsNode.getString(3); if (svnFilename != null && svnFilename.length() > 0) { log.debug("Found " + relPath + " in the wc.db: " + svnFilename); // try get the source, using the internal SVN file path, // building the path back up correctly HttpMessage svnSourceFileAttackMsg = new HttpMessage( new URI(uri.getScheme(), uri.getAuthority(), pathminusfilename + ".svn/" + svnFilename, null, null)); svnSourceFileAttackMsg.setCookieParams(this.getBaseMsg().getCookieParams()); // svnsourcefileattackmsg.setRequestHeader(this.getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader()); sendAndReceive(svnSourceFileAttackMsg, false); // do not follow redirects int svnSourceFileAttackMsgStatusCode = svnSourceFileAttackMsg .getResponseHeader().getStatusCode(); if (shouldStop(alertThreshold, svnSourceFileAttackMsgStatusCode)) { return false; } if (!UNWANTED_RESPONSE_CODES.contains(svnSourceFileAttackMsgStatusCode)) { // If the // response is // wanted (not // on the // unwanted // list) String attackFilename = uri.getScheme() + "://" + uri.getAuthority() + pathminusfilename + ".svn/" + svnFilename; if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("The contents for request '" + attackFilename + "' do not return 404 or 3**, so we possibly have the source code using SVN >= 1.7"); } // check the contents of the output to some degree, if // we have a file extension. // if not, just try it (could be a false positive, but // hey) String evidence = findEvidenceForExtension( svnSourceFileAttackMsg.getResponseBody().getBytes(), fileExtension); if (evidence != null) { // if we get to here, is is very likely that we have // source file inclusion attack. alert it. bingo(Alert.RISK_MEDIUM, getConfidence(svnSourceFileAttackMsgStatusCode), getName(), getDescription(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), null, attackFilename, getExtraInfo(urlfilename, attackFilename), getSolution(), evidence, svnSourceFileAttackMsg); // do not return.. need to tidy up first } else { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug( "The HTML output does not look like source code of type " + fileExtension); } } else { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("Got an unsuitable response code " + svnSourceFileAttackMsg.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() + ", so it looks like SVN >= 1.7 source code file was not found"); } } break; // out of the loop. even though there should be just // 1 entry } } } catch (SQLException sqlEx) { StringBuilder errorSb = new StringBuilder(300); errorSb.append("Error executing SQL on temporary SVN SQLite database '"); errorSb.append(sqliteConnectionUrl); errorSb.append("': "); errorSb.append(sqlEx); errorSb.append("\nThe saved response likely wasn't a SQLite db."); log.debug(errorSb); } catch (Exception e) { log.debug("An error has occurred, related to the temporary SVN SQLite DB. " + e); } finally { // the JDBC driver in use does not play well with "try with // resource" construct. I tried! if (rsRepo != null) rsRepo.close(); if (rsNode != null) rsNode.close(); if (rsSVNWCFormat != null) rsSVNWCFormat.close(); if (pragmaStatement != null) pragmaStatement.close(); if (nodeStatement != null) nodeStatement.close(); } } else throw new SQLException("Could not open a JDBC connection to SQLite file " + tempSqliteFile.getAbsolutePath()); } catch (Exception e) { // the connection will have been closed already, since we're used a try with // resources log.error("Error parsing temporary SVN SQLite database " + sqliteConnectionUrl); } finally { // delete the temp file. // this will be deleted when the VM is shut down anyway, but better to be // safe than to run out of disk space. tempSqliteFile.delete(); } break; // out of the while loop } // non 404, 300, etc for "wc.db", for SVN >= 1.7 // set up the parent directory name pathminusfilename = pathminusfilename.substring(0, pathminusfilename.substring(0, pathminusfilename.length() - 1).lastIndexOf("/") + 1); } } catch (Exception e) { log.warn("Got an error trying to find source code using the format used by SVN >= 1.7", e); } return false; }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrulesBeta.UsernameEnumeration.java
/** * looks for username enumeration in the login page, by changing the username field to be a * valid / invalid user, and looking for differences in the response *///from w ww . jav a 2 s.co m @Override public void scan() { // the technique to determine if usernames can be enumerated is as follows, using a variant // of the Freiling+Schinzel method, // adapted to the case where we do not know which is the username field // // 1) Request the original URL n times. (The original URL is assumed to have a valid // username, if not a valid password). Store the results in A[]. // 2) Compute the longest common subsequence (LCS) of A[] into LCS_A // 3) for each parameter in the original URL (ie, for URL params, form params, and cookie // params) // 4) Change the current parameter (which we assume is the username parameter) to an invalid // username (randomly), and request the URL n times. Store the results in B[]. // 5) Compute the longest common subsequence (LCS) of B[] into LCS_B // 6) If LCS_A <> LCS_B, then there is a Username Enumeration issue on the current parameter try { boolean loginUrl = false; // Are we dealing with a login url in any of the contexts of which this uri is part URI requestUri = getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI(); // using the session, get the list of contexts for the url List<Context> contextList = extAuth.getModel().getSession().getContextsForUrl(requestUri.getURI()); // now loop, and see if the url is a login url in each of the contexts in turn... for (Context context : contextList) { URI loginUri = extAuth.getLoginRequestURIForContext(context); if (loginUri != null) { if (requestUri.getScheme().equals(loginUri.getScheme()) && requestUri.getHost().equals(loginUri.getHost()) && requestUri.getPort() == loginUri.getPort() && requestUri.getPath().equals(loginUri.getPath())) { // we got this far.. only the method (GET/POST), user details, query params, // fragment, and POST params // are possibly different from the login page. loginUrl = true; log.info(requestUri.toString() + " falls within a context, and is the defined Login URL. Scanning for possible Username Enumeration vulnerability."); break; // Stop checking } } } // the Username Enumeration scanner will only run for logon pages if (loginUrl == false) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug(requestUri.toString() + " is not a defined Login URL."); } return; // No need to continue for this URL } // find all params set in the request (GET/POST/Cookie) TreeSet<HtmlParameter> htmlParams = new TreeSet<>(); htmlParams.addAll(getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getCookieParams()); // request cookies only. no response cookies htmlParams.addAll(getBaseMsg().getFormParams()); // add in the POST params htmlParams.addAll(getBaseMsg().getUrlParams()); // add in the GET params int numberOfRequests = 0; if (this.getAttackStrength() == AttackStrength.INSANE) { numberOfRequests = 50; } else if (this.getAttackStrength() == AttackStrength.HIGH) { numberOfRequests = 15; } else if (this.getAttackStrength() == AttackStrength.MEDIUM) { numberOfRequests = 5; } else if (this.getAttackStrength() == AttackStrength.LOW) { numberOfRequests = 3; } // 1) Request the original URL n times. (The original URL is assumed to have a valid // username, if not a valid password). Store the results in A[]. // make sure to manually handle all redirects, and cookies that may be set in response. // allocate enough space for the responses StringBuilder responseA = null; StringBuilder responseB = null; String longestCommonSubstringA = null; String longestCommonSubstringB = null; for (int i = 0; i < numberOfRequests; i++) { // initialise the storage for this iteration // baseResponses[i]= new StringBuilder(250); responseA = new StringBuilder(250); HttpMessage msgCpy = getNewMsg(); // clone the request, but not the response sendAndReceive(msgCpy, false, false); // request the URL, but do not automatically follow redirects. // get all cookies set in the response TreeSet<HtmlParameter> cookies = msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getCookieParams(); int redirectCount = 0; while (HttpStatusCode.isRedirection(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode())) { redirectCount++; if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Following redirect " + redirectCount + " for message " + i + " of " + numberOfRequests + " iterations of the original query"); // append the response to the responses so far for this particular instance // this will give us a complete picture of the full set of actual traffic // associated with following redirects for the request responseA.append(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getHeadersAsString()); responseA.append(msgCpy.getResponseBody().toString()); // and manually follow the redirect // create a new message from scratch HttpMessage msgRedirect = new HttpMessage(); // create a new URI from the absolute location returned, and interpret it as // escaped // note that the standard says that the Location returned should be absolute, // but it ain't always so... URI newLocation = new URI(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION), true); try { msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setURI(newLocation); } catch (Exception e) { // the Location field contents may not be standards compliant. Lets generate // a uri to use as a workaround where a relative path was // given instead of an absolute one URI newLocationWorkaround = new URI(msgCpy.getRequestHeader().getURI(), msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION), true); // try again, except this time, if it fails, don't try to handle it if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The Location [" + newLocation + "] specified in a redirect was not valid (not absolute?). Trying absolute workaround url [" + newLocationWorkaround + "]"); msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setURI(newLocationWorkaround); } msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setMethod(HttpRequestHeader.GET); // it's always a GET for a redirect msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setContentLength(0); // since we send a GET, the body will be 0 long if (cookies.size() > 0) { // if a previous request sent back a cookie that has not since been // invalidated, we need to set that cookie when following redirects, as a // browser would msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setCookieParams(cookies); } if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("DEBUG: Following redirect to [" + newLocation + "]"); sendAndReceive(msgRedirect, false, false); // do NOT redirect.. handle it here // handle scenario where a cookie is unset in a subsequent iteration, or where // the same cookie name is later re-assigned a different value // ie, in these cases, do not simply (and dumbly) accumulate cookie detritus. // first get all cookies set in the response TreeSet<HtmlParameter> cookiesTemp = msgRedirect.getResponseHeader().getCookieParams(); for (Iterator<HtmlParameter> redirectSetsCookieIterator = cookiesTemp .iterator(); redirectSetsCookieIterator.hasNext();) { HtmlParameter cookieJustSet = redirectSetsCookieIterator.next(); // loop through each of the cookies we know about in cookies, to see if it // matches by name. // if so, delete that cookie, and add the one that was just set to cookies. // if not, add the one that was just set to cookies. for (Iterator<HtmlParameter> knownCookiesIterator = cookies.iterator(); knownCookiesIterator .hasNext();) { HtmlParameter knownCookie = knownCookiesIterator.next(); if (cookieJustSet.getName().equals(knownCookie.getName())) { knownCookiesIterator.remove(); break; // out of the loop for known cookies, back to the next cookie // set in the response } } // end of loop for cookies we already know about // we can now safely add the cookie that was just set into cookies, knowing // it does not clash with anything else in there. cookies.add(cookieJustSet); } // end of for loop for cookies just set in the redirect msgCpy = msgRedirect; // store the last redirect message into the MsgCpy, as we // will be using it's output in a moment.. } // end of loop to follow redirects // now that the redirections have all been handled.. was the request finally a // success or not? Successful or Failed Logins would normally both return an OK // HTTP status if (!HttpStatusCode.isSuccess(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode())) { log.warn("The original URL [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] returned a non-OK HTTP status " + msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() + " (after " + i + " of " + numberOfRequests + " steps). Could be indicative of SQL Injection, or some other error. The URL is not stable enough to look at Username Enumeration"); return; // we have not even got as far as looking at the parameters, so just // abort straight out of the method } if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Done following redirects!"); // append the response to the responses so far for this particular instance // this will give us a complete picture of the full set of actual traffic associated // with following redirects for the request responseA.append(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getHeadersAsString()); responseA.append(msgCpy.getResponseBody().toString()); // 2) Compute the longest common subsequence (LCS) of A[] into LCS_A // Note: in the Freiling and Schinzel method, this is calculated recursively. We // calculate it iteratively, but using an equivalent method // first time in, the LCS is simple: it's the first HTML result.. no diffing // required if (i == 0) longestCommonSubstringA = responseA.toString(); // else get the LCS of the existing string, and the current result else longestCommonSubstringA = this.longestCommonSubsequence(longestCommonSubstringA, responseA.toString()); // optimisation step: if the LCS of A is 0 characters long already, then the URL // output is not stable, and we can abort now, and save some time if (longestCommonSubstringA.length() == 0) { // this might occur if the output returned for the URL changed mid-way. Perhaps // a CAPTCHA has fired, or a WAF has kicked in. Let's abort now so. log.warn("The original URL [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] does not produce stable output (at " + i + 1 + " of " + numberOfRequests + " steps). There is no static element in the output that can be used as a basis of comparison for the result of requesting URLs with the parameter values modified. Perhaps a CAPTCHA or WAF has kicked in!!"); return; // we have not even got as far as looking at the parameters, so just // abort straight out of the method } } // get rid of any remnants of cookie setting and Date headers in the responses, as these // cause false positives, and can be safely ignored // replace the content length with a non-variable placeholder // replace url parameters with a non-variable placeholder to eliminate tokens in URLs in // the output longestCommonSubstringA = longestCommonSubstringA.replaceAll("Set-Cookie:[^\\r\\n]+[\\r\\n]{1,2}", ""); longestCommonSubstringA = longestCommonSubstringA.replaceAll("Date:[^\\r\\n]+[\\r\\n]{1,2}", ""); longestCommonSubstringA = longestCommonSubstringA.replaceAll("Content-Length:[^\\r\\n]+[\\r\\n]{1,2}", "Content-Length: XXXX\n"); longestCommonSubstringA = longestCommonSubstringA .replaceAll("(?<=(&|\\?)[^\\?\"=&;]+=)[^\\?\"=&;]+(?=(&|\"))", "YYYY"); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The LCS of A is [" + longestCommonSubstringA + "]"); // 3) for each parameter in the original URL (ie, for URL params, form params, and // cookie params) for (Iterator<HtmlParameter> iter = htmlParams.iterator(); iter.hasNext();) { HttpMessage msgModifiedParam = getNewMsg(); HtmlParameter currentHtmlParameter = iter.next(); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Handling [" + currentHtmlParameter.getType() + "] parameter [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "], with value [" + currentHtmlParameter.getValue() + "]"); // 4) Change the current parameter value (which we assume is the username parameter) // to an invalid username (randomly), and request the URL n times. Store the results // in B[]. // get a random user name the same length as the original! String invalidUsername = RandomStringUtils.random(currentHtmlParameter.getValue().length(), RANDOM_USERNAME_CHARS); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The invalid username chosen was [" + invalidUsername + "]"); TreeSet<HtmlParameter> requestParams = null; if (currentHtmlParameter.getType().equals(HtmlParameter.Type.cookie)) { requestParams = msgModifiedParam.getRequestHeader().getCookieParams(); requestParams.remove(currentHtmlParameter); requestParams.add(new HtmlParameter(currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), invalidUsername.toString())); // add in the invalid username msgModifiedParam.setCookieParams(requestParams); } else if (currentHtmlParameter.getType().equals(HtmlParameter.Type.url)) { requestParams = msgModifiedParam.getUrlParams(); requestParams.remove(currentHtmlParameter); requestParams.add(new HtmlParameter(currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), invalidUsername.toString())); // add in the invalid username msgModifiedParam.setGetParams(requestParams); } else if (currentHtmlParameter.getType().equals(HtmlParameter.Type.form)) { requestParams = msgModifiedParam.getFormParams(); requestParams.remove(currentHtmlParameter); requestParams.add(new HtmlParameter(currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), invalidUsername.toString())); // add in the invalid username msgModifiedParam.setFormParams(requestParams); } if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("About to loop for " + numberOfRequests + " iterations with an incorrect user of the same length"); boolean continueForParameter = true; for (int i = 0; i < numberOfRequests && continueForParameter; i++) { // initialise the storage for this iteration responseB = new StringBuilder(250); HttpMessage msgCpy = msgModifiedParam; // use the message we already set up, with the // modified parameter value sendAndReceive(msgCpy, false, false); // request the URL, but do not automatically follow redirects. // get all cookies set in the response TreeSet<HtmlParameter> cookies = msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getCookieParams(); int redirectCount = 0; while (HttpStatusCode.isRedirection(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode())) { redirectCount++; if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Following redirect " + redirectCount + " for message " + i + " of " + numberOfRequests + " iterations of the modified query"); // append the response to the responses so far for this particular instance // this will give us a complete picture of the full set of actual traffic // associated with following redirects for the request responseB.append(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getHeadersAsString()); responseB.append(msgCpy.getResponseBody().toString()); // and manually follow the redirect // create a new message from scratch HttpMessage msgRedirect = new HttpMessage(); // create a new URI from the absolute location returned, and interpret it as // escaped // note that the standard says that the Location returned should be // absolute, but it ain't always so... URI newLocation = new URI(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION), true); try { msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setURI(newLocation); } catch (Exception e) { // the Location field contents may not be standards compliant. Lets // generate a uri to use as a workaround where a relative path was // given instead of an absolute one URI newLocationWorkaround = new URI(msgCpy.getRequestHeader().getURI(), msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION), true); // try again, except this time, if it fails, don't try to handle it if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The Location [" + newLocation + "] specified in a redirect was not valid (not absolute?). Trying absolute workaround url [" + newLocationWorkaround + "]"); msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setURI(newLocationWorkaround); } msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setMethod(HttpRequestHeader.GET); // it's always a GET for a redirect msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setContentLength(0); // since we send a GET, the body will be 0 long if (cookies.size() > 0) { // if a previous request sent back a cookie that has not since been // invalidated, we need to set that cookie when following redirects, as // a browser would msgRedirect.getRequestHeader().setCookieParams(cookies); } sendAndReceive(msgRedirect, false, false); // do NOT redirect.. handle it here // handle scenario where a cookie is unset in a subsequent iteration, or // where the same cookie name is later re-assigned a different value // ie, in these cases, do not simply (and dumbly) accumulate cookie // detritus. // first get all cookies set in the response TreeSet<HtmlParameter> cookiesTemp = msgRedirect.getResponseHeader().getCookieParams(); for (Iterator<HtmlParameter> redirectSetsCookieIterator = cookiesTemp .iterator(); redirectSetsCookieIterator.hasNext();) { HtmlParameter cookieJustSet = redirectSetsCookieIterator.next(); // loop through each of the cookies we know about in cookies, to see if // it matches by name. // if so, delete that cookie, and add the one that was just set to // cookies. // if not, add the one that was just set to cookies. for (Iterator<HtmlParameter> knownCookiesIterator = cookies .iterator(); knownCookiesIterator.hasNext();) { HtmlParameter knownCookie = knownCookiesIterator.next(); if (cookieJustSet.getName().equals(knownCookie.getName())) { knownCookiesIterator.remove(); break; // out of the loop for known cookies, back to the next // cookie set in the response } } // end of loop for cookies we already know about // we can now safely add the cookie that was just set into cookies, // knowing it does not clash with anything else in there. cookies.add(cookieJustSet); } // end of for loop for cookies just set in the redirect msgCpy = msgRedirect; // store the last redirect message into the MsgCpy, as // we will be using it's output in a moment.. } // end of loop to follow redirects // now that the redirections have all been handled.. was the request finally a // success or not? Successful or Failed Logins would normally both return an OK // HTTP status if (!HttpStatusCode.isSuccess(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode())) { log.warn("The modified URL [" + msgModifiedParam.getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] returned a non-OK HTTP status " + msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode() + " (after " + i + 1 + " of " + numberOfRequests + " steps for [" + currentHtmlParameter.getType() + "] parameter " + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "). Could be indicative of SQL Injection, or some other error. The URL is not stable enough to look at Username Enumeration"); continueForParameter = false; continue; // skip directly to the next parameter. Do not pass Go. Do not // collect $200. } if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Done following redirects!"); // append the response to the responses so far for this particular instance // this will give us a complete picture of the full set of actual traffic // associated with following redirects for the request responseB.append(msgCpy.getResponseHeader().getHeadersAsString()); responseB.append(msgCpy.getResponseBody().toString()); // 5) Compute the longest common subsequence (LCS) of B[] into LCS_B // Note: in the Freiling and Schinzel method, this is calculated recursively. We // calculate it iteratively, but using an equivalent method // first time in, the LCS is simple: it's the first HTML result.. no diffing // required if (i == 0) longestCommonSubstringB = responseB.toString(); // else get the LCS of the existing string, and the current result else longestCommonSubstringB = this.longestCommonSubsequence(longestCommonSubstringB, responseB.toString()); // optimisation step: if the LCS of B is 0 characters long already, then the URL // output is not stable, and we can abort now, and save some time if (longestCommonSubstringB.length() == 0) { // this might occur if the output returned for the URL changed mid-way. // Perhaps a CAPTCHA has fired, or a WAF has kicked in. Let's abort now so. log.warn("The modified URL [" + msgModifiedParam.getRequestHeader().getURI() + "] (for [" + currentHtmlParameter.getType() + "] parameter " + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + ") does not produce stable output (after " + i + 1 + " of " + numberOfRequests + " steps). There is no static element in the output that can be used as a basis of comparison with the static output of the original query. Perhaps a CAPTCHA or WAF has kicked in!!"); continueForParameter = false; continue; // skip directly to the next parameter. Do not pass Go. Do not // collect $200. // Note: if a CAPTCHA or WAF really has fired, the results of subsequent // iterations will likely not be accurate.. } } // if we didn't hit something with one of the iterations for the parameter (ie, if // the output when changing the parm is stable), // check if the parameter might be vulnerable by comparins its LCS with the original // LCS for a valid login if (continueForParameter == true) { // get rid of any remnants of cookie setting and Date headers in the responses, // as these cause false positives, and can be safely ignored // replace the content length with a non-variable placeholder // replace url parameters with a non-variable placeholder to eliminate tokens in // URLs in the output longestCommonSubstringB = longestCommonSubstringB .replaceAll("Set-Cookie:[^\\r\\n]+[\\r\\n]{1,2}", ""); longestCommonSubstringB = longestCommonSubstringB.replaceAll("Date:[^\\r\\n]+[\\r\\n]{1,2}", ""); longestCommonSubstringB = longestCommonSubstringB .replaceAll("Content-Length:[^\\r\\n]+[\\r\\n]{1,2}", "Content-Length: XXXX\n"); longestCommonSubstringB = longestCommonSubstringB .replaceAll("(?<=(&|\\?)[^\\?\"=&;]+=)[^\\?\"=&;]+(?=(&|\"))", "YYYY"); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The LCS of B is [" + longestCommonSubstringB + "]"); // 6) If LCS_A <> LCS_B, then there is a Username Enumeration issue on the // current parameter if (!longestCommonSubstringA.equals(longestCommonSubstringB)) { // calculate line level diffs of the 2 Longest Common Substrings to aid the // user in deciding if the match is a false positive // get the diff as a series of patches Patch diffpatch = DiffUtils.diff( new LinkedList<String>(Arrays.asList(longestCommonSubstringA.split("\\n"))), new LinkedList<String>(Arrays.asList(longestCommonSubstringB.split("\\n")))); int numberofDifferences = diffpatch.getDeltas().size(); // and convert the list of patches to a String, joining using a newline // String diffAB = StringUtils.join(diffpatch.getDeltas(), "\n"); StringBuilder tempDiff = new StringBuilder(250); for (Delta delta : diffpatch.getDeltas()) { String changeType = null; if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.CHANGE) changeType = "Changed Text"; else if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.DELETE) changeType = "Deleted Text"; else if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.INSERT) changeType = "Inserted text"; else changeType = "Unknown change type [" + delta.getType() + "]"; tempDiff.append("\n(" + changeType + ")\n"); // blank line before tempDiff.append("Output for Valid Username : " + delta.getOriginal() + "\n"); // no blank lines tempDiff.append("\nOutput for Invalid Username: " + delta.getRevised() + "\n"); // blank line before } String diffAB = tempDiff.toString(); String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.usernameenumeration.alert.extrainfo", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), currentHtmlParameter.getValue(), // original value invalidUsername.toString(), // new value diffAB, // the differences between the two sets of output numberofDifferences); // the number of differences String attack = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.usernameenumeration.alert.attack", currentHtmlParameter.getType(), currentHtmlParameter.getName()); String vulnname = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.usernameenumeration.name"); String vulndesc = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.usernameenumeration.desc"); String vulnsoln = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.usernameenumeration.soln"); // call bingo with some extra info, indicating that the alert is bingo(Alert.RISK_INFO, Alert.CONFIDENCE_LOW, vulnname, vulndesc, getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), currentHtmlParameter.getName(), attack, extraInfo, vulnsoln, getBaseMsg()); } else { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("[" + currentHtmlParameter.getType() + "] parameter [" + currentHtmlParameter.getName() + "] looks ok (Invalid Usernames cannot be distinguished from Valid usernames)"); } } } // end of the for loop around the parameter list } catch (Exception e) { // Do not try to internationalise this.. we need an error message in any event.. // if it's in English, it's still better than not having it at all. log.error("An error occurred checking a url for Username Enumeration issues", e); } }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.bruteforce.ScanTarget.java
public ScanTarget(URI uri) { this.uri = copyURI(uri); this.scheme = uri.getScheme(); try {/*from w w w .ja v a 2 s . co m*/ this.host = uri.getHost(); } catch (URIException e) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Failed to get host from URI: " + e.getMessage(), e); } this.port = getPort(scheme, uri.getPort()); try { this.uri.setPath(null); this.uri.setQuery(null); this.uri.setFragment(null); } catch (URIException ignore) { // It's safe to set the URI query, path and fragment components to null. } this.stringRepresentation = createHostPortString(host, port); buildHtmlStringRepresentation(); }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.callgraph.CallGraphFrame.java
/** * sets up the graph by retrieving the nodes and edges from the history table in the database * * @param urlPattern/*w w w .ja v a2s .c o m*/ * @throws SQLException */ private void setupGraph(Pattern urlPattern) throws SQLException { Connection conn = null; Statement st = null; ResultSet rs = null; Map<String, String> schemaAuthorityToColor = new HashMap<String, String>(); // use some web safe colours. Currently, there are 24 colours. String[] colors = { "#FFFF00", "#FFCC00", "#FF9900", "#FF6600", "#FF3300", "#CCFF00", "#CCCC00", "#CC9900", "#CC6600", "#99FF00", "#999900", "#996600", "#CCFFCC", "#CCCCCC", "#99CCCC", "#9999CC", "#9966CC", "#66FFCC", "#6699CC", "#6666CC", "#33FFCC", "#33CCCC", "#3399CC", "#00FFCC" }; int colorsUsed = 0; try { // Create a pattern for the specified // get a new connection to the database to query it, since the existing database classes // do not cater for // ad-hoc queries on the table /* * TODO Add-ons should NOT make their own connections to the db any more - the db layer is plugable * so could be implemented in a completely different way * TODO: how? There is currently no API to do this. */ // Note: the db is a singleton instance, so do *not* close it!! Database db = Model.getSingleton().getDb(); if (!(db instanceof ParosDatabase)) { throw new InvalidParameterException(db.getClass().getCanonicalName()); } conn = ((ParosDatabaseServer) db.getDatabaseServer()).getNewConnection(); // we begin adding stuff to the graph, so begin a "transaction" on it. // we will close this after we add all the vertexes and edges to the graph graph.getModel().beginUpdate(); // prepare to add the vertices to the graph // this must include all URLs references as vertices, even if those URLs did not feature // in the history table in their own right // include entries of type 1 (proxied), 2 (spidered), 10 (Ajax spidered) from the // history st = conn.createStatement(); rs = st.executeQuery( "select distinct URI from HISTORY where histtype in (1,2,10) union distinct select distinct RIGHT(REGEXP_SUBSTRING (REQHEADER, 'Referer:.+') , LENGTH(REGEXP_SUBSTRING (REQHEADER, 'Referer:.+'))-LENGTH('Referer: ')) from HISTORY where REQHEADER like '%Referer%' and histtype in (1,2,10) order by 1"); for (; rs.next();) { String url = rs.getString(1); // remove urls that do not match the pattern specified (all sites / one site) Matcher urlmatcher = urlPattern.matcher(url); if (urlmatcher.find()) { // addVertex(url , url); try { URI uri = new URI(url, false); String schemaAuthority = uri.getScheme() + "://" + uri.getAuthority(); String path = uri.getPathQuery(); if (path == null) path = "/"; String color = schemaAuthorityToColor.get(schemaAuthority); if (color == null) { // not found already.. so assign this scheme and authority a color. if (colorsUsed >= colors.length) { throw new Exception("Too many scheme/authority combinations. Ne need more colours"); } color = colors[colorsUsed++]; schemaAuthorityToColor.put(schemaAuthority, color); } addVertex(path, url, "fillColor=" + color); } catch (Exception e) { log.error("Error graphing node for URL " + url, e); } } else { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("URL " + url + " does not match the specified pattern " + urlPattern + ", so not adding it as a vertex"); } } // close the resultset and statement rs.close(); st.close(); // set up the edges in the graph st = conn.createStatement(); rs = st.executeQuery( "select distinct RIGHT(REGEXP_SUBSTRING (REQHEADER, 'Referer:.+') , LENGTH(REGEXP_SUBSTRING (REQHEADER, 'Referer:.+'))-LENGTH('Referer: ')), URI from HISTORY where REQHEADER like '%Referer%' and histtype in (1,2,10) order by 2"); mxGraphModel graphmodel = (mxGraphModel) graph.getModel(); for (; rs.next();) { String predecessor = rs.getString(1); String url = rs.getString(2); // now trim back all urls from the base url // Matcher predecessorurlmatcher = urlpattern.matcher(predecessor); // if (predecessorurlmatcher.find()) { // predecessor = predecessorurlmatcher.group(1); // } // Matcher urlmatcher = urlpattern.matcher(url); // if (urlmatcher.find()) { // url = urlmatcher.group(1); // } // remove urls that do not match the pattern specified (all sites / one site) Matcher urlmatcher1 = urlPattern.matcher(predecessor); if (!urlmatcher1.find()) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Predecessor URL " + predecessor + " does not match the specified pattern " + urlPattern + ", so not adding it as a vertex"); continue; // to the next iteration } Matcher urlmatcher2 = urlPattern.matcher(url); if (!urlmatcher2.find()) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("URL " + url + " does not match the specified pattern " + urlPattern + ", so not adding it as a vertex"); continue; // to the next iteration } // check that we have added the url as a vertex in its own right.. definitely should // have happened.. mxCell predecessorVertex = (mxCell) graphmodel.getCell(predecessor); mxCell postdecessorVertex = (mxCell) graphmodel.getCell(url); if (predecessorVertex == null || postdecessorVertex == null) { log.warn("Could not find graph node for " + predecessor + " or for " + url + ". Ignoring it."); continue; } // add the edge (ie, add the dependency between 2 URLs) graph.insertEdge(parent, predecessorVertex.getId() + "-->" + postdecessorVertex.getId(), null, predecessorVertex, postdecessorVertex); } // once all the vertices and edges are drawn, look for root nodes (nodes with no // incoming edges) // we will display the full URl for these, rather than just the path, to aid viewing the // graph Object[] vertices = graph.getChildVertices(graph.getDefaultParent()); for (Object vertex : vertices) { Object[] incomingEdgesForVertex = graph.getIncomingEdges(vertex); if (incomingEdgesForVertex == null || (incomingEdgesForVertex != null && incomingEdgesForVertex.length == 0)) { // it's a root node. Set it's value (displayed label) to the same as it's id // (the full URL) mxCell vertextCasted = (mxCell) vertex; vertextCasted.setValue(vertextCasted.getId()); // now sort out the text metrics for the vertex, since the size of the displayed // text has been changed Dimension textsize = this.getTextDimension((String) vertextCasted.getValue(), this.fontmetrics); mxGeometry cellGeometry = vertextCasted.getGeometry(); cellGeometry.setHeight(textsize.getHeight()); cellGeometry.setWidth(textsize.getWidth()); vertextCasted.setGeometry(cellGeometry); } } } catch (SQLException e) { log.error("Error trying to setup the graph", e); throw e; } finally { if (rs != null && !rs.isClosed()) rs.close(); if (st != null && !st.isClosed()) st.close(); if (conn != null && !conn.isClosed()) conn.close(); // mark the "transaction" on the graph as complete graph.getModel().endUpdate(); } }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.invoke.InvokeAppWorker.java
@Override protected Void doInBackground() throws Exception { String url = ""; // Full URL String host = ""; // Just the server name, e.g. localhost String port = ""; // the port String site = ""; // e.g. http://localhost:8080/ String postdata = ""; // only present in POST ops String cookie = ""; // from the request header HistoryReference historyRef = msg.getHistoryRef(); int msgid = -1; if (historyRef != null) { msgid = historyRef.getHistoryId(); }/*from ww w . j a v a 2 s . c o m*/ URI uri = msg.getRequestHeader().getURI(); url = uri.toString(); host = uri.getHost(); site = uri.getScheme() + "://" + uri.getHost(); if (uri.getPort() > 0) { port = String.valueOf(uri.getPort()); site = site + ":" + port + "/"; } else { if (uri.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase("http")) { port = "80"; } else if (uri.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase("https")) { port = "443"; } site = site + "/"; } if (msg.getRequestBody() != null) { postdata = msg.getRequestBody().toString(); postdata = postdata.replaceAll("\n", "\\n"); } Vector<String> cookies = msg.getRequestHeader().getHeaders(HttpHeader.COOKIE); if (cookies != null && cookies.size() > 0) { cookie = cookies.get(0); } List<String> cmd = new ArrayList<>(); cmd.add(command); if (parameters != null) { for (String parameter : parameters.split(" ")) { // Replace all of the tags String finalParameter = parameter.replace("%url%", url).replace("%host%", host) .replace("%port%", port).replace("%site%", site).replace("%cookie%", cookie) .replace("%postdata%", postdata).replace("%msgid%", String.valueOf(msgid)); // Replace header tags Matcher headers = Pattern.compile("%header-([A-z0-9_-]+)%").matcher(finalParameter); while (headers.find()) { String headerValue = msg.getRequestHeader().getHeader(headers.group(1)); if (headerValue == null) { headerValue = ""; } finalParameter = finalParameter.replace(headers.group(0), headerValue); } cmd.add(finalParameter); } } logger.debug("Invoking: " + cmd.toString()); View.getSingleton().getOutputPanel().append("\n" + cmd.toString() + "\n"); ProcessBuilder pb = new ProcessBuilder(cmd); if (workingDir != null) { pb.directory(workingDir); } pb.redirectErrorStream(true); Process proc; try { proc = pb.start(); } catch (final Exception e) { View.getSingleton().getOutputPanel() .append(Constant.messages.getString("invoke.error") + e.getLocalizedMessage() + "\n"); logger.warn("Failed to start the process: " + e.getMessage(), e); return null; } if (captureOutput) { try (BufferedReader brOut = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(proc.getInputStream()))) { String line; boolean isOutput = false; StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); if (msg.getNote() != null) { sb.append(msg.getNote()); sb.append('\n'); } // Show any stdout/error messages while ((line = brOut.readLine()) != null) { View.getSingleton().getOutputPanel().append(line + "\n"); sb.append(line); sb.append('\n'); isOutput = true; } if (isOutput) { // Somethings been written, switch to the Output tab View.getSingleton().getOutputPanel().setTabFocus(); } if (outputNote) { HistoryReference hr = msg.getHistoryRef(); if (hr != null) { hr.setNote(sb.toString()); } } } } return null; }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.openapi.ExtensionOpenApi.java
public List<String> importOpenApiDefinition(final URI uri, final String siteOverride, boolean initViaUi) { Requestor requestor = new Requestor(HttpSender.MANUAL_REQUEST_INITIATOR); requestor.addListener(new HistoryPersister()); try {/*from w w w.j a va2 s .c o m*/ return importOpenApiDefinition(Scheme.forValue(uri.getScheme().toLowerCase()), uri.getAuthority(), requestor.getResponseBody(uri), siteOverride, initViaUi); } catch (IOException e) { if (initViaUi) { View.getSingleton().showWarningDialog(Constant.messages.getString("openapi.io.error")); } LOG.warn(e.getMessage(), e); } catch (Exception e) { LOG.error(e.getMessage(), e); } return null; }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.pscanrulesAlpha.StrictTransportSecurityScanner.java
@Override public void scanHttpResponseReceive(HttpMessage msg, int id, Source source) { long start = System.currentTimeMillis(); Vector<String> stsOption = msg.getResponseHeader().getHeaders(STS_HEADER); String metaHSTS = getMetaHSTSEvidence(source); if (msg.getRequestHeader().isSecure()) { // No point reporting missing for non-SSL resources // Content available via both HTTPS and HTTP is a separate though related issue if (stsOption == null) { // Header NOT found boolean report = true; if (!this.getAlertThreshold().equals(AlertThreshold.LOW) && HttpStatusCode.isRedirection(msg.getResponseHeader().getStatusCode())) { // Only report https redirects to the same domain at low threshold try { String redirStr = msg.getResponseHeader().getHeader(HttpHeader.LOCATION); URI srcUri = msg.getRequestHeader().getURI(); URI redirUri = new URI(redirStr, false); if (redirUri.isRelativeURI() || (redirUri.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase("https") && redirUri.getHost().equals(srcUri.getHost()) && redirUri.getPort() == srcUri.getPort())) { report = false;//from www .ja va 2s . c om } } catch (Exception e) { // Ignore, so report the missing header } } if (report) { raiseAlert(VulnType.HSTS_MISSING, null, msg, id); } } else if (stsOption.size() > 1) { // More than one header found raiseAlert(VulnType.HSTS_MULTIPLE_HEADERS, null, msg, id); } else { // Single HSTS header entry String stsOptionString = stsOption.get(0); Matcher badAgeMatcher = BAD_MAX_AGE_PATT.matcher(stsOptionString); Matcher maxAgeMatcher = MAX_AGE_PATT.matcher(stsOptionString); Matcher malformedMaxAgeMatcher = MALFORMED_MAX_AGE.matcher(stsOptionString); Matcher wellformedMatcher = WELL_FORMED_PATT.matcher(stsOptionString); if (!wellformedMatcher.matches()) { // Well formed pattern didn't match (perhaps curly quotes or some other unwanted // character(s)) raiseAlert(VulnType.HSTS_MALFORMED_CONTENT, STS_HEADER, msg, id); } else if (badAgeMatcher.find()) { // Matched BAD_MAX_AGE_PATT, max-age is zero raiseAlert(VulnType.HSTS_MAX_AGE_DISABLED, badAgeMatcher.group(), msg, id); } else if (!maxAgeMatcher.find()) { // Didn't find a digit value associated with max-age raiseAlert(VulnType.HSTS_MAX_AGE_MISSING, stsOption.get(0), msg, id); } else if (malformedMaxAgeMatcher.find()) { // Found max-age but it was malformed raiseAlert(VulnType.HSTS_MALFORMED_MAX_AGE, stsOption.get(0), msg, id); } } } else if (AlertThreshold.LOW.equals(this.getAlertThreshold()) && stsOption != null && !stsOption.isEmpty()) { // isSecure is false at this point // HSTS Header found on non-HTTPS response (technically there could be more than one // but we only care that there is one or more) raiseAlert(VulnType.HSTS_ON_PLAIN_RESP, stsOption.get(0), msg, id); } if (metaHSTS != null) { // HSTS found defined by META tag raiseAlert(VulnType.HSTS_META, metaHSTS, msg, id); } if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) { logger.debug("\tScan of record " + id + " took " + (System.currentTimeMillis() - start) + " ms"); } }